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INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this thesis is on the political agenda underlying Asia-
Pacific economic co-operation. These agenda will be explored with 
reference to the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum, and an 
attempt made to assess the feasibility of the APEC forum by examining the 
discrepancies between the stated objectives of APEC and the implicit 
political factors behind each participant's position. 
In order to do this, it is important to define regional co-operation in 
the Asia-Pacific context. As will be argued, it is necessary to 
conceptualise Asia-Pacific regionalism as a gradual and continuing process 
of community building, designed to enhance understanding and dialogue in 
the pursuit of greater co-operation on common economic interests. It is 
about the establishment of a loose regional identity around the perception 
that certain commonalities exist, and contribute to the mutual 
identification of such interests. What must be emphasised is that 
regionalism in the Asia-Pacific context is still in its early stages and 
the APEC forum is the first attempt to co-operate on a regional, 
multilateral basis at government level. Whether this attempt succeeds 
depends on the differing political agenda underlying the responses to 
APEC. 
There is little history of regional cohesion, due mainly to the diversity 
in levels of economic development, culture, ideology and security 
interests. However, as a result of global economic changes, and regional 
growth and development, certain pragmatic economic interests can be 
identified. These provide the basis for an informal co-operative process 
at government level. Yet these interests must also be placed within a 
political framework. It is the degree of variation in these political 
interests which will influence the success of APEC. Even if a government 
level forum is desirable, APEC will not prove feasible unless the 
differing political agenda are compatible with each other, and compatible 
with the stated objectives of APEC. 
Chapter One provides a general theoretical introduction to the idea of 
regionalism and argues that theories of formal regional integration are 
inappropriate in this context, as they generally postulate some form of 
continuum between economic and political integration . What is envisaged 
in the Asia-Pacific context is a loose and informal concept of community 
building through which to pursue common economic interests, without 
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subordinating national interests, although co-operation will, to a degree, 
impinge on sovereignty. 
Chapter Two discusses the global political economy as the essential 
context in which to place efforts at regional economic co-operation. 
Changes in the global economy are providing impetus to the exploration of 
new forms of regionalism, in an attempt to respond to the advantages and 
limits of international economic trends. Three such trends are 
identified. The internationalisation of the global economy is underpinned 
by multilateralism, but complicated by the perceived decreasing utility of 
the latter as states react to the consequences of the former. This 
reaction takes the form of the use of nationalist policies, which are to 
an extent directed against economies in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Discriminatory regional arrangements are reflective of these trends, but 
are shown to be inappropriate to the aims of Asia-Pacific regionalism. 
In Chapter Three, the focus narrows to that of the Asia-Pacific region, 
and its economic significance is discussed before outlining the important 
historical sequence of regional co-operative events and mechanisms. An 
understanding of this is necessary to more fully appreciate the sort of 
co-operation regional states envisage. From the historical literature, 
one can derive a number of common objectives for co-operation and these 
objectives were reflected in the agenda of the first APEC forum. The 
results of this meeting are highlighted, in terms of objectives and 
agreements, as it provides an important reference point for the rest of 
the examination. 
Chapter Four initially discusses the regional political and security 
situation, before turning to an examination of the country specific 
political agenda for regional economic co-operation. The United States, 
Japan, Australia, South Korea, Canada and New Zealand will be reviewed 
individually, and ASEAN will be examined in terms of its composite 
position. In addition, Chapter Five explores two other political issues 
important to the future success of APEC: the institutionalisation of the 
process and the issue of participation. 
Finally, an evaluation of the politics of Asia-Pacific economic co-
operation will be presented, as well as a determination of the feasibility 
of co-operation and the implications for theories of regionalism. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THEORIES OF REGIONALISM 
In the Asia-Pacific context, regionalism is largely conceptualised as a 
process of "corrununity building", aiming at informal co-operation between 
sovereign states in the pursual of common ends. This stands in contrast 
to a more common definition of regionalism: that of regional integration 
embodying a formal and institutional process. Such regional integration 
theories focused on both European and developing country cases in an 
attempt to investigate generalities which could then be applied to other 
regions in the quest for peaceful change. Whilst very limited in their 
applicability to the Asia-Pacific region, regional integration theories 
provide a useful theoretical context in which to place more recent 
explorations of the Asia-Pacific regional process. 
Regionalism is a heavily geographic term, describing relations that are 
not international in scope, and encompassing the idea of the mutual 
interdependence of participating units (Herr 1976). These units must 
relate in a way which isolates them as an entity distinct from other 
combinations (Herr 1976). Whilst geography is an obvious criterion, it 
is usually not the only one used in the conceptualisation of a region. In 
addition, political, ideological and economic factors, singly or in 
combination, often provide the essential elements in countries' 
perceptions that together they comprise a distinct region. 
Regional integration theories were predominant in explaining the economic 
integration process which occurred in Western Europe in the 1950s and 
1960s. Most important were the transactionalist theory of Karl Deutsch 
(Deutsch et al 1957) and the nee-functionalist theory of Ernst Haas (Haas 
and Whiting 1956, Haas 1958). Transactionalism was so called as it tested 
propositions concerning regional community formation by examining the 
frequencies of intra and inter-group transactions (Puchala 1988). 
Primarily a quantitative concept, transactionalism aimed at describing 
conditions leading to international political unification. In this way, 
communities which "self-consciously self-identify" provided the essential 
conditions for institutional amalgamation and therefore, regional 
integration (Puchala 1988). 
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Similarly, nee-functionalism attempted to determine if there were general 
conditions in functional institutional amalgamation that could precipitate 
integration anywhere (Puchala 1988). In contrast to the 
transactionalists, nee-functionalists suggested that institutional 
amalgamation preceded and led to regional community by refocusing 
political attention and initiating a shift in loyalties (Puchala 1988). 
In addition, nee-functionalism explicitly posited a unidirectional 
continuum from regional economic integration to political integration. 
Co-operation in economic fields was believed to "spillover" into other 
fields as a result of functional linkages between sectors (Fry 1979). 
Politicisation of co-operation became automatic as it expanded, leading to 
the creation of supra-national authorities, to which state power shifted, 
and ultimately full political integration (Fry 1979). 
As Fry (1979) argues, the problems with nee-functionalism included its 
normative bias, using economic integration as a strategy for regional 
political integration, in the quest for peaceful change. The model was 
Eurocentric, which limited applicability to the rest of the world, and the 
theories have been criticised as merely post-hoc generalisations of events 
current at the time (see Puchala 1988). However, the main limitation, 
from the point of view of this thesis, is that these theories fail to deal 
with instances of regionalism which are not motivated by a desire for 
formal integration, especially political integration. 
The economic integration component of nee-functionalist theory may, at 
first examination, appear useful in the context of Asia-Pacific economic 
co-operation. The idea of economic integration originates from Jacob 
Viner' s use of the principle of comparative advantage to explain the 
achievement of higher levels of regional welfare through the freeing of 
trade (Axline 1979). Drysdale and Garnaut (1989) however, comprehensively 
argue against a free trade area in the Asia-Pacific region, although there 
is vast potential for intra-Pacific trade based on differences in relative 
endowments of natural resources, labour and capital. They argue that as 
many Asian and Pacific countries' growth strategies depend on global trade 
liberalisation and access to international markets, a regional free trade 
area would probably damage development potential, not result in increased 
welfare gains, uniformly experienced. 
this sense is not a regional aim. 
Therefore, economic integration in 
Contrasting with Eurocentric integration theory are other regional 
integration theories which have concentrated on the developing country 
case. These differ from nee-functionalism, not only in their focus, but 
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in the emphasis on discontinuities, both within and between economic and 
political integration. 
Axline (1979) examines the possibility of political integration in the 
Caribbean through the exploration of the particular conditions relevant to 
developing countries. Integration, it is believed, contributes to 
economic development, although political conflict can arise as the welfare 
gains from integration are usually unevenly distributed. The likelihood 
of integration is based on the opportunity costs of participation versus 
specific national and sub-national interests. For Axline (1979), the 
process of integration is marked by discontinuities, uncertainty and 
instability, with regional gains being only slowly realised. This 
undermines the nee-functionalist notion of an economic-political 
continuum, and functional spillover, but the explanatory value is still 
limited to a specific case. 
Payne ( 198 0) also examines the Caribbean from an integrationist 
perspective, and believes that economic integration does not mean a 
political community where government authority is ceded. Instead, 
regionalism means the agreement on the co-operative use of some 
instruments of government in regional decision making, with national 
interest ultimately remaining supreme. For Payne, political integration 
would have to be an objective which is consciously and explicitly pursued, 
as it does not automatically follow from economic integration. In order 
to cede any state authority there must be very compelling inducements and 
he fails to identify any such inducements in the Caribbean. 
Payne (1980 pp284,285) believes that: 
Instead, 
"(w) hat the Caribbean Community has done is to promote the 
coexistence of regional integration at one level with regional 
fragmentation at another." In other words: "it is a structure 
created by national governments to make nationalist policies more 
effective by pursuing them within a regional framework". 
Payne (198 0 p2 8 6) names this process "regionalisation", a half-way 
position between nationalism and regional integration. This is a more 
useful concept than integration, one which allows specific national 
interests to be considered. 
Further, Groom and Heraclides (1985) reconceptualise regional integration 
as a process, where units move between conditions of complete isolation 
and complete integration. The movement is two-way, towards both ends of 
the spectrum. Although this is also an advance over the neo-
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functionalists' unidirectional continuum, the implication that a continuum 
exists, still remains. 
Whilst some of the ideas outlined above will be found to be useful in 
examining the politics of Asia-Pacific economic co-operation, the idea of 
a continuum of economic and political relations is not. What is occurring 
in the Asia-Pacific region are the early stages of an undefined process of 
co-operation. Formal integration is explicitly rejected by regional 
countries and is inappropriate to the as yet ill-defined goals of co-
operation. Perhaps a more useful way of describing regional co-operation 
in this context, is that of a process taking place within a multi-
dimensional framework containing a network of interactive links. As will 
be argued, Asia-Pacific economic co-operation is essentially a political 
process, motivated by more than pragmatic economic rationale, but not 
aiming at formal integration. Existing regional theories which emphasise 
such integration are inappropriate. As Drysdale (1988a) emphasises, the 
particularly heterogenous nature of the Asia-Pacific region means that the 
region cannot rely on models of co-operation from elsewhere because of the 
diversity of interests in the area. Instead, for Drysdale, heterogeneity 
in the region means a pluralist community where responsibility and 
leadership are shared. Drysdale (1988a p219) states: 
"A pluralistic community is one which accommodates heterogeneity 
and in which there is a measure of equality among the members as 
they engage in the process of seeking and settling upon common 
understandings and come to collective agreements." 
Little has been written on the specific community building process in the 
Asia-Pacific region, but what has been written has been similar in 
conception. One useful idea is that outlined by Han Sung-joo (1983). For 
Han (1983), community derives from a sense of regional exclusiveness and 
identity. Usually this is based on social homogeneity, geographical and 
psychological prox imity and rout ual knowledge. Han believes that the 
latter two expand with increasing transactions, but in the Asia-Pacific 
region mutual knowledge is limited. 
Similarly Soesastro (1983), in distinguishing between structure 
(geography, economic relations) and process (social change, psychological 
aspects) as concepts of community, emphasises the latter. He also 
believes that the Pacific community idea needs socialisation through a 
process essentially psychological in nature, which in turn will give rise 
to "a more intensive or more e x tensive attitude and practice of 
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interdependence, co-operation, collaboration and unification" (Soesastro 
1983 p42) . 
As Han (1983) points out, the sense of exclusiveness can expand if the 
actors unite against a readily identifiable threat. Harris (1989b) also 
highlights this and takes the sense of exclusiveness further to include 
commonly held expectations of gain as a unifying principle as well. 
Therefore, this thesis will argue that regionalism in the Asia-Pacific 
context is a unique process, which focuses on economic co-operation, but 
is underpinned by national political interests, which although diverse, 
have elements of commonality. It is the commonality of interest which 
contributes to the perception of belonging to a "region". Whilst the 
nature of this region is at present ill-defined, a community building 
process based on a very loose definition of "Asia-Pacific" is in its early 
stages. The stimuli for this are occurring not only from within the 
region itself, but as a result of global economic changes, embodying 
conditions whereby regional exploration of co-operation becomes 
attractive. This, combined with regional and national interests, provides 
the foundation for conclusions as to the political agenda underlying the 
regional co-operative movement. What must be emphasised is not the 
likelihood of formal economic or political integration, but the 
possibility of furthering economic co-operation in the mutual interests of 
regional countries. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE GLOBAL CONTEXT: INTERNATIONALISM, 
NATIONALISM AND DISCRIMINATORY REGIONALISM 
The broader global political economy embodies three trends which provide 
the essential global context underlying Asia-Pacific economic co-
operation, and provide impetus to the exploration of new forms of regional 
co-operation. These can be identified as two opposing movements: 
internationalism and nationalism, which are accompanied by a trend to 
regionalism, in the form of both discriminatory and non-discriminatory 
trading arrangements. The increasing internationalisation of the global 
economy, with its dependence on a multilateral rule based system, has had, 
and will continue to have, profound effects on the control and direction 
of a state's national economy. As a result, there is a resort to 
nationalist economic policies designed to regain greater state autonomy. 
In turn, exploration of discriminatory regional arrangements can be linked 
to these nationalist and internationalist trends. 
Internationalism 
Internationalism is the result of ongoing fundamental structural changes 
in the world economy resulting in a more closely integrated global 
environment (see Helliwell 1989, Harris 1989a). Advances in transport, 
communications and technology have provided enhanced links between global 
economic centres, so facilitating the use of world-wide production 
locations. Large transnational corporations have evolved which are able 
to take advantage of global cost differentials by segmenting the 
production process. In turn, access to global markets means that products 
sourced outside a country are increasingly competing with that country's 
production. In addition, the composition of international trade is 
changing to include a greater proportion of trade in services. 
As Harris (1989a) discusses, the opening up of international capital 
markets has also had a profound effect on the nature of the world economy. 
The freeing of exchange rates, whilst restoring national 
these rates, has contributed to internationalisation. 
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autonomy over 
As a result, 
domestic markets have become more responsive to events such as world price 
and interest rate changes, thus decreasing state autonomy over domestic 
economic direction. 
This internationalisation of economic activity has changed traditional 
notions of comparative advantage, as it no longer depends solely on a 
fixed resource base. Increasingly, as Winham (1986) highlights, states 
are able to determine their own comparative advantage, or have it 
determined for them, through freedom of international investment and 
changes in the structure of trade. Trade no longer is solely a national 
prerogative with exchanges involving various combinations of governments 
and private enterprise, and influenced by transnational events. 
However, as the 1989 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Annual 
Report on the international trading system points out, although the world 
economy has entered a cycle of mutually reinforcing high investment, 
buoyant manufacturing output and expanding international trade; this is 
set against a background of mounting trade protectionism, severe exchange 
rate volatility and generally deflationary monetary policies, all of which 
usually hinder growth in output and trade (Rowley 1989b). As a result of 
globalisation, there is a resurgence of nationalist policy and action in 
an attempt to reassert control over domestic economic direction. As 
Krause ( 1981) has pointed out, the negative interpretation of 
interdependence means less "inter" and more "dependence", and results in 
forced domestic adjustment due to this loss of control. The opposing 
dynamics of internationalism and nationalism are perhaps best summarised 
by Helliwell (1989 p75): 
" ... globalisation encourages structural rigidities as political 
answers to insulate the domestic economy from the winds of 
change, and requires structural improvements to keep national and 
global economies sufficiently adaptable and open to respond to 
and benefit from these global trends." 
Internationalism has been founded on multilateral structures, rules and 
policies which have underwritten the success of the liberal post-war 
economic order. Whilst the utility and effectiveness of multilateralism 
comes into question in the face of nationalist policies, it is the 
multilateral trading system which has provided the conditions for the 
phenomenal growth experienced by the nations of the Asia-Pacific region. 
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Multilateralism and the Utility of The GATT 
Multilateralism is enshrined in the GATT principles of reciprocity in 
tariff concessions, transparency of trade barriers and the Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) principle of nondiscrimination, where concessions are given 
to all parties equally, in the pursual of free and fair trade (Dam 1970). 
As Schott (1989) points out, these principles mean that the GATT is 
designed to yield the global welfare benefits of trade creation without 
the disadvantages of trade diversion. This is especially important to 
smaller players which depend on global trade for development and economic 
wellbeing, but do not have the economic diversity or strength to rely on 
preferential trading agreements. The advantage of the GATT is that it is 
an international rule based system, not an obvious power based system 
(although it has always been predicated to a large extent on the power of 
the US), which means that size and strength do not necessarily determine 
trading concessions. 
However, the GATT system is perceived to be deteriorating. In many ways 
the GATT is a victim of its own success, being slow to adjust to the 
changing patterns of international commerce and the magnitude of economic 
growth (Schott 1989). Yet as Harris (1989b) argues, the GATT is not in 
itself an automatically liberalising system as it is limited by its 
reciprocity provisions. Instead it is designed to manage international 
trade, and its liberal nature is, to a degree, accidental. 
Viravan (1989) identifies five elements signifying the deterioration of 
the GATT system, which reflect the dual forces of nationalism and 
internationalism. Firstly, the most serious threat is seen to be the 
erosion of the principle of nondiscrimination, by the increase of 
preferential and bilateral arrangements to maintain or enhance terms of 
trade. As Viravan points out, once major trading countries cease to 
respect this principle, the system loses its most effective sanction, 
which is retaliation by major trading countries against each other. 
Secondly, the GATT is threatened by the abandonment of the norms of a 
market economy in the domestic policies of major trading countries, with 
the increasing use of subsidies and non-tariff barriers being prime 
examples. Thirdly, these same countries are objecting to the notion that 
competition is legitimate and to the validity of comparative advantage, as 
they seek to erect protectionist barriers against competitive goods. 
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Fourthly, the trend to protectionism is vividly illustrated by the 
increase in agricultural protection, with the European Community's (EC's) 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the United States' Export Enhancement 
Programme (EEP) being the two most obvious examples. Finally, Viravan 
points to the emergence of a defined developing country group within the 
GATT system which has very different demands to those of the 
industrialised nations. 
The perception of the GATT's decreasing utility is evident in the current 
Uruguay Round, with many observers increasingly pessimistic about useful 
outcomes in the areas of intellectual property rights, services and 
agriculture. This provides impetus for states to pursue other 
arrangements to protect their trading interests. However, cause and 
effect are difficult to untangle. Negotiated bilateral and regional 
agreements, and the perceived need to explore these, are distracting 
attention from the GATT when it most needs the unequivocal commitment of 
its members. Although some observers hope that the threat of 
discriminatory trading arrangements may stimulate attention to the Uruguay 
Round, there is also the danger that more trading deals may be negotiated 
instead (Patterson 1989). 
Economic Nationalism 
The move away from multilateralism is evident in the global rise of 
nationalist policies. As Donges (1988) outlines, the salient features of 
this protectionist drift are not only discrimination against the most 
competitive overseas economies, but include selective protection according 
to the needs of specific sectors and a concentration in non-tariff 
barriers. As low cost suppliers emerge to provide increasing import 
competition, the policy response by those threatened is to urge the 
competitors to exercise self restraint in their exports. This is 
especially prominent in agriculture and textiles and clothing, two areas 
where the highly industrialised states are not as competitive as many 
developing nations. 
The negative consequence of protection is that it de links economic 
development from market conditions and hinders the structural adaptability 
of the economy. However, domestic measures often have public support, as 
politically sensitive issues (such as food security in Japan), are usually 
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at stake. Therefore as the public becomes receptive to nationalist 
policies, the political will to alter those policies diminishes. 
The shift away from multilateralism is most evident in the larger states, 
especially the United States. The US has been described as a declining 
hegemon, indicated by the discrepancy between its global commitments and 
its economic ability to maintain them, which is believed indicative of a 
diminished role in global political affairs (see Kennedy 1989, Cerny 1989, 
Gilpin 1987). In opposition to this are those who not only question the 
premises underlying the idea of hegemonic decline, but argue that the 
United States retains significant structural power and/or control over 
outcomes (see Strange 1988, Brzezinski 1988, Gill 1986, Russett 1985). 
However, the rise in economic power of other states may be heralding an 
era of multipolarity, rather than hegemonic or bipolar dominance. 
In any case, the United States' position towards multilateralism has 
become ambiguous as the US resorts to increased bilateralism and 
management of trade in order to defend its trading interests. The US 
trade deficit has soared and the blame for this has been attributed to 
unfair trade practices of others, rather than finding the answers at home 
in terms of macroeconomic imbalances and domestic budgetary problems 
(Drysdale and Garnaut 1989) Although United States' declaratory policy 
is that these policies are used to further the process of global trade 
liberalisation, scepticism within the US about the efficacy of the GATT 
means that such agreements have been threatened as a substitute for 
multilateralism (Schott 1989) As the United States is the major market 
and economic partner for so many countries, especially in the Asia-Pacific 
region, the fear of exclusion has in turn provided some impetus for others 
to explore regional arrangements, either with the US itself, or amongst 
themselves. 
Discriminatory treatment is increasingly being used as a bargaining tool 
to gain changes in trading partners' policies (see Pomfret 1988). This is 
evident in the United States' 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, 
in the "Super 301" section. Section 301 enables identification of other 
countries' unfair trade practices, negotiation on these trade barriers, 
and if negotiations are unsuccessful, the imposition of sanctions 
(Bhagwati 1988). Even if the sanctions stage is not reached, the 
political and psychological pressure of Section 301 may make countries 
more accommodating, and may also lead to trade diversion from other 
countries to the US. 
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There is also the view however, most forcefully put by Strange (1985), 
that nationalist policies are not necessarily having a significant effect 
on trade. Strange believes that the difficulties in the global economy 
are due to financial and monetary factors, and changes in production and 
business practices, rather than protectionist policies. Yet whereas the 
latter factors are undoubtedly contributing to current global trade 
difficulties, it does remain that it is the nationalist nature of trade 
exchanges, and the inequitable distribution of costs and benefits, which 
are creating problems in international trade. For Asia-Pacific countries, 
a multilateral rule based system is seen as a more equitable mechanism for 
managing trade, rather than a power based model which is the inevitable 
consequence of free ranging nationalist policies. 
However, the dual forces of internationalism and nationalism in economic 
activity are reflected in a trend to economic regionalism, which is not 
necessarily the comfortable middle ground it immediately appears. 
Regionalism can range from highly discriminatory free trade areas to loose 
associations committed to multilateral principles. It is the latter that 
the countries of the Pacific Rim appear to be working towards, yet it is 
the possibility of the former which creates part of the impetus for 
regional co-operation to be considered at all. 
Discriminatory Regionalism Free Trade Areas 
Free Trade Areas (FTAs) are sometimes heralded as concrete steps toward 
regional economic integration, with the culmination of such policies 
believed to be the formation of customs unions. Yet, apart from the EC, 
existing and proposed FTAs do not appear to have this as an ultimate aim. 
Instead, discriminatory regional co-operation is both a response to, and 
indication of, nationalist tendencies, rather than an explicit desire for 
economic integration. 
The advantages of FTAs include the maintenance of market access, the 
promotion of trade and the improvement of economic efficiency and growth 
as a result of the economies of large scale production. More importantly 
however, FTAs are increasingly being explored as a defensive option, to 
avoid discrimination should others negotiate similar arrangements (see 
Wonnacott and Lutz 1989). As Rowley (1989a) points out, if the world 
regressed into trading blocs, those containing the EC, the US, Canada and 
a possible Asian grouping would account for 80 % of world trade. The 
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temptation to do deals within or between blocs and ignore the rest of the 
world would have adverse consequences for states marginalised by these 
agreements. 
FTAs undermine the GATT al though they can be sanctioned by it under 
Article XXIV (see Dam 1970). As Patterson (1989) points out, once a free 
trade agreement is signed, participants are less likely to want 
multilateral negotiations lest they prejudice the preferential benefits 
the partners expect under the original agreement. However, the most 
serious consequences of FTAs are their trade diverting effects, 
redirecting trade by according preferences to co-operative partners. This 
allows the partners to replace lower cost suppliers from third countries, 
resulting in global welfare losses (Schott 1989). 
Although the formation of FTAs does not yet signify a global devolution 
into trading blocs, the examples of a European Single Integrated Market in 
1992 and the 1988 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement do highlight 
fears that discriminatory policies may gain at the expense of 
multilateralism. Both examples have significant effects on economic and 
political relations, especially with the Asia-Pacific region, because the 
perception is that these arrangements are in part aimed at it, largely due 
to the region's growth and competitiveness. 
The movement towards the creation of a single integrated market in Europe 
in 1992 is generally viewed with the suspicion that it will become an 
inward looking protectionist trading bloc (Mather 1989). By 1992, the aim 
is to remove all remaining physical, technical and fiscal trade barriers, 
which should result in the internal benefits of trade expansion and 
increased productivity, as European companies continue to restructure to 
take advantage of a market of 320 million consumers (Balassa 1989). 
However, Conceicao (1989 p79) argues that the EC's external trade policy 
"has been the most flagrant breach of the non-discrimination principle" of 
the GATT due to its geographically discriminatory trade barriers. The 
EC's trade policy, especially with respect to agriculture, continues to 
have global welfare reducing effects. It is also feared that the EC may 
provide the impetus for the formation of other discriminatory 
arrangements, not only by the us, but by countries such as Japan and South 
Korea as they see their European markets diminish and investment attempts 
frustrated. 
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The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988 is also viewed as 
further evidence of the rise in discriminatory policies. It is however, 
probably best expla~ned as a natural move in terms of geography and trade, 
as Canada and the United States are each others' largest trading partners. 
They both expect the gains in efficiency and productivity to enhance 
competitiveness in each others', and world, markets (see Schott 1988, 
Smith 1988). However, difficult issues, such as agriculture and services, 
are still unresolved. 
The global concern about this FTA is that it also incurs costs for states 
not party to the agreement, such as the substitution of trade from third 
countries as US-Canada exports grow at the expense of goods still facing 
tariff, as well as non-tariff, barriers (Schott 1988). In addition, a 
powerful trading bloc like this must to some degree reduce United States' 
and Canadian incentives to further the process of multilateral 
liberalisation. It also has a powerful negative psychological effect on 
the rest of the world, as the perception of an increasingly protectionist 
and inaccessible US is heightened. This is further illustrated by the 
United States' exploration of possible free trade areas with other 
economic partners, including a US-ASEAN FTA (Ariff 1989), a US-Japan FTA 
(Drysdale and Garnaut 1989) and a US-Australia FTA (Snape 1989). 
States within the Asia-Pacific region exhibit much concern about the 
growth of FTAs, as this area seems to be a target of many protectionist 
policies. ASEAN has long been exploring the possibility of a free trade 
area between its members. In addition, the Australia-New Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations (CER) Trade Agreement has been expanded to mean free 
trade in 1990 (see Lange 1989, Wilde 1989, Bollard and Thompson 1987). 
However, the stated aim of CER is to make both nations more 
internationally competitive. From the perspective of two small states, an 
inward looking trade area is simply not an option as both heavily rely on 
multilateral trade freedom. 
However, with fears of the consequences of Europe 1992 and US economic 
nationalism, access to markets is a major concern. Development strategies 
in the Asia-Pacific region, mainly based on export led growth, depend on 
unrestricted access to markets. Therefore the majority Asia-Pacific 
interest is in global trade liberalisation and the multilateral process. 
As renewed impetus needs to be injected into the multilateral system, 
outward looking regional co-operation may be the answer, as regional 
economic co-operation does not have to be discriminatory in nature (see 
Chen 1989, Harris 1989b). Combined voice and action may enhance global 
15 
trade liberalisation and avoid the damaging consequences of an increase in 
nationalist policies, whilst taking advantage of the benefits of 
internationalism. It is partly this perception of a common aim which has 
underwritten more recent exploration of economic co-operation in the Asia-
Pacific region. 
1 6 
CHAPTER THREE 
ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
CO-OPERATION 
The current nature of the global economy provides impetus for regional 
economic co-operation, yet the idea of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific has 
been explored and refined since the 1960s. There are historical 
precedents for economic co-operation: both in calls to action and in 
existing co-operative mechanisms. An examination of this historical 
context, as well as the characteristics of the region, is necessary in 
order to determine not only what regionalism in the Asia-Pacific 
environment means, but the objectives that economic co-operation can adopt 
in order to satisfy the diverse range of regional interests. The trend to 
regionalism can be seen to culminate in the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
operation (APEC) forum, the first meeting of which occurred in November 
1989. The resulting objectives of APEC were not only predicated on 
historical factors, but become important reference factors against which 
to examine the political motivations for regional economic co-operation. 
Characteristics of the Asia-Pacific Region 
The Asia-Pacific region is generally defined by the countries around the 
perimeter of the Pacific Rim. This usually includes North, but not South, 
America, although there is some debate about the validity of including 
more than just the west coast of the United States in a definition of that 
part of the Asia-Pacific region. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
entire US will be included as part of a region which exhibits the fastest 
economic growth in the world. The Asia-Pacific has a 59.2 % share of world 
Gross National Product (GNP), 37.9% share of world exports and 41.2 % share 
of world imports (Drysdale 1988a). In addition, intra-regional trade is 
increasing steadily, with trans-Pacific trade growing at a faster rate 
than world trade, and overtaking trans-Atlantic trade. Already 63 % of 
Pacific countries' trade is intra-regional (Drysdale and Garnaut 1989). 
According to Drysdale and Patrick (1979), the growth of the Pacific 
economy is due to three interactive factors. The growth in Japan's 
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industrial power resulted in a large increase in Japanese demand and in 
Japanese outflows of capital and technology. This helped to stimulate the 
growth and trade of the developing regional economies, which based their 
development strategies on outward-looking trade-oriented 
industrialisation. The Asian countries specialised in labour intensive 
manufactures, guided by the principle of high productivity. This was 
supported by a rapid rise in foreign investment and a high savings ratio 
(Westpac 1989, National Australia Bank 1989). The third factor in Pacific 
growth was the slower growth in Western Europe and its resulting decline 
in competitiveness, giving Pacific economies a greater trade advantage. 
The Asia-Pacific region has been characterised by shifting comparative 
advantage. The Asian Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs - South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore) have taken over the sectors where Japan is 
no longer competitive, with the rest of ASEAN and China taking over the 
low value-added categories where the NIES no longer compete (Westpac 
1989). By contrast, corrunodity dependent countries, such as Australia and 
New Zealand, have been unable to sustain their share of world trade. 
The region also has high trade, aid and investment flows from the United 
States and Japan. In 1983, the region accounted for 44 % of US exports and 
53 % of US imports, which illustrates regional dependence on the United 
States' market (Drysdale 1988a). In the case of Japan, in 1983 the Asia-
Pacific region accounted for 60 % of Japan's exports and 53 % of its imports 
(Drysdale 1988a). During the period 1976-1985, US share of accumulated 
investment in the region was 40 %, with Japan accounting for a further 44 % 
(Drysdale 1988a). While the United States and Japan have undoubtedly 
contributed to the rapid growth of the Pacific, this growth has also 
generated further fundamental forces that will continue to drive the 
region's economic performance. There is an increasing reliance on 
domestically driven economic expansion, as well as a reliance on other 
Asia-Pacific markets (National Australia Bank 1989) . 
Yet, while the economic forces f o r Asia-Pacific co-operation may be 
considerable, so are the obstacles which must be overcome. Firstly, there 
is the sheer heterogeneity in culture, ethnic composition, ideology, 
security interests and levels of economic development (Han 1983). As 
Krause (1981) has pointed out, the Pacific has little history of regional 
consciousness . Han (1983) c omments that e xcept for United Nations' 
organisations, it is difficult to discover a successful case o f 
international co-operation which has involved such a diverse group of 
countries. There is a lack of mutual understanding due to inadequate 
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mechanisms for communication, and political alignments are diverse and 
fluid, which in turn highlights the need for a process designed at 
enhancing understanding. 
In addition, structural adjustment throughout the region is uneven. As 
Drysdale and Garnaut (1989) discuss, high protectionist barriers remain in 
large industries which are losing comparative advantage. The main 
examples of protection are foodstuffs in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, and 
labour intensive commodities and standard technology manufacturing 
industries in North America, Australia and New Zealand. Protection is 
also evident in agriculture in China and some ASEAN countries, which 
contrasts with the efficient agricultural production of Australia and New 
Zealand. Protection in manufacturing is complex, with low average tariff 
levels in the United States, Canada and Japan, but high average levels in 
Australia and New Zealand. Non-tariff barriers also have to be taken into 
account, especially visible in the us, and Drysdale and Garnaut find these 
are also high for manufactured goods in Korea, Taiwan, China and some 
ASEAN countries. Singapore and Hong Kong, by contrast, have the most 
liberal import systems in the world. 
Drysdale and Garnaut (1989 p230) believe that a striking feature of the 
data on Pacific trade is "the tendency for Pacific countries' exports to 
be heavily concentrated in commodities against which other Pacific 
countries impose high barriers to trade." Due to changing comparative 
advantage, countries have moved to protect industries which are losing 
competitiveness owing to the region's growth. 
p230) conclude that: 
Drysdale and Garnaut (1989 
"should Pacific countries reduce their assistance to their most 
highly protected industries on a non-discriminatory basis, the 
associated export expansion is likely to be concentrated in other 
Pacific countries simply on grounds of competitiveness 
(t) here is certainly considerable scope for further trade 
expansion." 
The region therefore is characterised by economic dynamism, tempered by 
uneven structural adjustment to regional economic growth. The constraints 
of diversity may explain why there is not greater economic cohesion 
amongst Asia-Pacific countries, but the very fact that such diversity 
exists may provide some impetus to explore a process enabling greater 
communication and harmonisation of policies. The economic potential to 
gain from greater co-operation certainly exists. What need to be resolved 
are differences in regional conceptions of co-operation. Formal economic 
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integration must be seen as less suitable to encompass such diversity than 
a looser concept of an Asia-Pacific community building process. 
The Historical Context 
The idea of Asia-Pacific economic co-operation has been advanced since the 
1960s, and in its earlier forms endorsed a regional free trade area. The 
most comprehensive review of the development of the idea is to be found in 
Soesastro (1983), who identifies three stages of Pacific economic co-
operation. Firstly there is the period from 1960-1967 which was 
characterised by the almost exclusively Japanese development of the idea. 
1968-1977 saw the internationalisation of the idea, but mainly restricted 
to academia and business. Finally, from 1978 there was the translation of 
ideas into attempts at action. This in turn has culminated in direct 
government interest, in the form of the APEC forum in 1989. 
In 1965, Japan's Kiyoshi Kojima first proposed a Pacific Free Trade Area 
(PAFTA) to include Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand (the "Pacific Five"). Kojima's PAFTA was very much a recognition 
that Japan's interests lay in the Pacific region, in the intensive and 
complementary patterns of trade which had the potential for expansion, and 
the prospect of cheaper raw materials and primary product imports (Kojima 
1971). Yet it was also a response to the formation of the European 
Community and its elimination of internal tariffs, resulting in fears of 
an inward looking Europe. There was the fear of an EC-European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) integration, or even a North Atlantic Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA). 
Kojima's (1971) proposal was for advanced Pacific countries to co-operate 
amongst themselves, but incorporated measures for trade and aid with the 
developing countries of Asia and Latin America, to assist regional 
economic development and promote closer economic co-operation. The 
benefits of a free trade area would be trade liberalisation and 
expansion, ultimately leading to regional integration. He envisaged the 
elimination of tariffs, which would be extended to Asia under a Most 
Favoured Nation clause, so that trade diversion would not affect their 
development. Yet Kojima also recognised that PAFTA was premature. The 
five countries lacked the necessary degree of integration, the diversity 
in stages of industrialisation meant that the gains from trade 
liberalisation would differ widely, and at that stage the participation of 
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the US in a discriminatory arrangement conflicted with its multilateral 
approach to global trade. 
In 1968, Kojima's free trade idea was recast in the form of the first 
Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD), which was initially 
designed for the Pacific Five countries' policy interested economists 
(Soesastro 1983). PAFTAD has since become a valuable independent forum 
for policy oriented discussions on Pacific Basin economic issues, with a 
greatly expanded membership (Crawford and Seow 1981). 
In the meantime, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was 
formed in 1967 with the aim of pursuing national priorities in the context 
of sub-regional interests (Mahathir 1981). More a political-security 
community, ASEAN aimed to work through consensus to develop a strong sense 
of community and a firm foundation for common action (Ghazali 1981) . 
Fiercely protective of its sub-regional identity, ASEAN has a history of 
resistance to ideas of regional 
define a generally non-aligned 
economic co-operation. Its attempt to 
(although pro-West) leadership role for 
itself in the greater region lead to fears of being undermined in any 
larger initiative. 
Also formed in 1967 was the Pacific Basin Economic Committee (PBEC), a 
private organisation of business interests originating from bilateral 
business co-operation between Australia and Japan. The main priority for 
PBEC is that of commercial matters, but has been criticised for its poor 
performance (see Woods (1988) for a review of PBEC, PAFTAD and PECC). 
However, the importance of PBEC was that it was one of the early concrete 
steps towards regional economic co-operation. As such, it has aided 
increased understanding and helped to set up personal and information 
networks which are so lacking in the region. 
In Japan, support for PAFTA was abandoned, with Kojima himself moving away 
from the concept. Instead of urging institutional integration, he 
proposed more functional integration with a "problem-by-problem" approach 
(Kojima 1976). Kojima (1976) moved on to advocate an Organisation for 
Pacific Trade, Aid and Development, which would include the developing 
countries as well as the Pacific Five. Kojima' s call for such an 
organisation was echoed throughout Australia and Japan. Crawford and 
Okita (1976) recommended it as an intergovernmental forum to their 
respective Australian and Japanese governments in 1976, and again in 1978, 
in the context of an examination of raw materials and interdependence in 
Australia, Japan and the Pacific (Crawford and Oki ta 1978). 
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Drysdale and Patrick's (1979) study for the United States' government on 
an Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD) in 1979 was in 
many ways the culmination of that round of debate. Given that the study 
was prepared for the United States' government on the US regional role, 
the internationalisation of the Pacific economic co-operation idea was 
given further impetus. Drysdale and Patrick argued against bilateral 
solutions to the problems of interdependence and believed that global 
organisations were limited in their functional value. Instead, "(t)he new 
economic power struggle and strong interdependence in the Pacific region 
suggests the need for a new regional reference point" (Drysdale and 
Patrick 1979 p15). They proposed an OPTAD modelled after the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), with a focus on trade 
and development interests, but without a bureaucratic infrastructure. 
More specifically, OPTAD had four goals. It was to be a "safety valve" 
for the discussion of trade and economic grievances. It was to provide 
stimuli to investment and aid flows for developing countries. It was to 
be a forum for consultation and discussion about long term economic 
transformation and it would establish a more secure framework of economic 
alliance. In this way OPTAD would help to maintain and manage crucial 
United States-Japan links, the increasing complexity of relationships 
between regional developing countries, and would aid constructive and 
stable relations among the regional powers (Drysdale and Patrick 1979). 
Drysdale and Patrick's OPTAD proposal represented a major attempt to 
translate ideas for economic co-operation into action. Although it 
received inadequate attention in the US, more interest was shown in the 
region. 
At the same time in Japan, a Pacific study group was established. The 
Pacific Basin Co-operation Study Group (PBCSG 1981), headed by Saburo 
Okita, concluded in November 1979 that the formation of a Pacific 
community was both desirable and feasible, although as Soesastro (1983) 
points out, their conclusions were cautious and open ended. However it 
was valuable in that it defined more clearly just what sort of co-
operation the Pacific nations were considering. 
was based on: 
The community envisaged 
" ... a regionalism that is open to the world, not one that is 
exclusive and closed, (as) the first characteristic of our 
concept. We are fully aware that a regional community without a 
perspective for a global community, a regionalism that excludes 
globalism, has no possibility of development and prosperity ... " 
(PBCSG 1981 p184) 
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In addition, the concept was characterised by free and open relations of 
interdependence internally, with the proviso that the community should not 
conflict with existing bilateral and multilateral co-operative relations. 
There was a need to "hasten slowly" incorporating respect for diversity 
and equality. 
Japan's Prime Minister Ohira visited Australia in January 1980 and agreed 
with Australia's Prime Minister Fraser to explore the Pacific Community 
idea. This prompted the Australian National University's Pacific Community 
Seminar, organised by Sir John Crawford, at the end of 1980, which 
involved representatives from around the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar 
provided the foundation for the establishment of the Pacific Economic Co-
operation Conference (PECC) and provided further impetus for calls for 
economic co-operation (see for example compilations edited by Crawford and 
Seow (1981) and Soesastro and Han (1983)). 
In 1982, the formal establishment of the PECC at Bangkok heralded a new 
era of tripartite co-operation between government, business and academia 
which has been significant and successful in encouraging greater Asia-
Pacific economic co-operation. It has perhaps become the central element 
in the regional co-operation movement since this date. The PECC is an 
informal series of consultative meetings, with task forces to examine 
trade in manufactures, agriculture and minerals; as well as investment and 
technology transfer, fisheries, telecommunications, transport and tourism. 
The PECC has been important in building a Pacific perspective on trade and 
development and in facilitating a significant coming together of countries 
by encouraging greater communication on relevant economic issues (Harris 
1989c). As an informal organisation, it avoids to a large extent, 
political and governmental pressures which could hinder the consensus 
building process. Its work, however, does provide input into the 
government policy making process of the countries involved. The PECC's 
significance also lies in the fact that not only did ASEAN overcome its 
aversion to participation in the overall regional process, but both China 
and Taiwan are members, with the Soviet Union and Latin American countries 
participating in various task forces. In this way it expands regional 
dialogue and communication on economic policy questions, and facilitates 
the identification of, and action on, issues of common concern (Drysdale 
1988a). 
In addition to the PECC, there was the establishment of an ASEAN based 
intergovernmental forum in 1984. This takes the form of an annual 
ministerial level consultation with ASEAN's dialogue partners, not only 
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limited to the Pacific, but including the EC as well. Until recently, 
South Korea had been excluded but there is now some interchange on 
specific sectoral issues. The ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) 
takes place after the annual meeting of ASEAN ministers and is focused on 
ASEAN's bilateral relations with its partners. 
However, since 1982, the PECC has played the major role in facilitating 
economic co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region. Yet in some ways, its 
input to regional economic policy has been limited by its informal nature 
and the lack of direct government interaction. These characteristics have 
of course been the PECC's strengths, necessary because of the embryonic 
nature of such co-operation. Yet the question becomes that of whether a 
more formal, governmental organisation is believed to be necessary and 
feasible. An attempt can be made to answer this, beginning with the 
identification of common objectives for regional economic co-operation, 
before turning to an examination of the first APEC forum. 
Regional Co-operation Objectives 
The historical context illustrates clearly the regional preference for 
informal, consultative arrangements through which to pursue co-operation. 
However, the diversity of economic and political interests within the 
region is counterpoised against some obvious objectives on which co-
operation may provide real region-wide benefits. The importance of 
identifying general objectives means that the specific political interests 
of each member can be compared with the objectives of regional co-
operation, and conclusions can be made as to the feasibility of such co-
operation. 
Three possible economic objectives have been generally identified, with 
the most important concerning trade and development issues (Harris 1989c, 
Drysdale 1988a, Crawford 1981, English 1981). The uneven structural 
adjustment process referred to earlier, provides opportunities for trade 
liberalisation, as well as action to increase regional economic gains 
through the co-ordination of economic activities and policies. Stimuli to 
increase and improve investment and aid flows could be enhanced, as well 
as greater action to deal with regional imbalances in the manufacturing 
and agricultural sectors. In turn, adjustment within the region would 
contribute to stronger global trade liberalisation and demonstrate the 
region's commitment to a multilateral trade regime. 
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Yet many of these trade and development issues cannot be addressed without 
adequate information on other countries' policies, and the knowledge that 
regional economic behaviour will be co-operative and predictable (Harris 
1989c). The second objective is that of an ongoing dialogue and 
communication process on regional economic issues. Asia-Pacific 
conference series, such as the PECC and PAFTAD, have made an invaluable 
contribution to this process. However, exchanges between governments tend 
to occur on a bilateral basis, and there- is little in the way of region-
wide governmental communication. One of the most important requirements 
is for a regional data base on trade and investment opportunities. There 
is a need for ongoing dissemination of information on national trade and 
economic policies, in order to enhance understanding and promote co-
operation in areas of mutual benefit. Mutual trust could be furthered by 
such a co-operative process, which in turn may improve policy making by 
broadening governments' perceptions of their interests (Krause and 
Sekiguchi 1981). A regular consultation at government level may enhance 
the regional communication process in order to facilitate economic growth 
and development. 
Thirdly, there is a perceived need to respond to the current limits of 
multilateralism in dealing with Asia-Pacific issues, and to respond to the 
nationalist trend in global economics, by developing consistent approaches 
in key areas of economic policy. In this way, a stronger regional voice 
in global fora could work for common Asia-Pacific interests, not only in 
trade liberalisation, but in other increasingly important areas such as 
transport and communications, and other service sectors. Co-operation 
could also address specific regional trade issues which are not adequately 
dealt with by the GATT or other international bodies. 
In addition to these economic objectives, there are the unspoken political 
agenda. As Harris (1989c) points out, there is the perhaps limited 
assumption that greater economic co-operation will lead to greater 
political stability and cohesion because economic links are supposed to 
discourage conflict. In addition, 
useful way of dealing with the 
a regional body could be seen as a 
deteriorating United States-Japan 
relationship, crucial to the economic wellbeing of the region. There are 
issues, such as Chinese economic modernisation and political changes in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which may benefit from a regional 
perspective. 
The APEC meeting in Canberra in November 1989 saw the participation of 
government ministers from twelve Asia-Pacific nations, to discuss regional 
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economic agenda generally targeted on the economic objectives outlined 
above. It is therefore necessary to turn to an examination of the APEC 
meeting, in order to highlight its significance to the regional co-
operation process, and to provide a reference point against which to 
explore the political agenda underlying Asia-Pacific economic co-
operation. 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Forum 
In a speech to South Korean business associations on 31 January 1989, 
Australia's Prime Minister Hawke gave renewed impetus to the idea of 
regional co-operation with the following statement: 
"I believe the time has come for us substantially to increase our 
efforts towards building regional co-operation and seriously to 
investigate what areas it might focus on and what forms it might 
take" (Hawke 1989a p4). 
He envisaged the creation of a "more formal intergovernmental vehicle" 
(Hawke 1989a p4) with the capacity for analysis and consultation to help 
inform economic policy development. Hawke explicitly stated his 
opposition to a protectionist trading bloc and saw merit in an OECD-type 
organisation. Suggested areas for co-operation included efforts to make 
the current Uruguay Round of the GATT more constructive, the discussion of 
obstacles to regional trade and the identification of common economic 
interests. 
The suggestion was immediately met with much resistance and some support. 
Initially it was unclear that Hawke's proposal was not a discriminatory 
trading bloc. In addition, Japan's Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) was at the same time floating a suggestion that the 
region's economic ministers meet, which resulted in some confusion, 
although MITI later became content to merge the two proposals (Hartcher 
1989). The major initial obstacle however, was Hawke's exclusion of North 
America, seeing his idea as a purely Western Pacific one. One motive for 
this exclusion can probably be found in a desire to allay smaller 
countries' fears of US domination (especially in the cases of South Korea 
and Thailand) . Fears of domination by Japan are just as real, but both 
the United States and Japan are crucial to the continued economic growth 
of the region. 
Review 1989a). 
Japan, by contrast, supported US inclusion (Financial 
By the end of March, Australia's Minister for Foreign 
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Affairs and Trade, Gareth Evans, conceded that the original idea would be 
replaced by a Pacific-wide concept, including the us, Canada and China 
(Edwards 1989a). 
In a co-ordinated attempt to provide substance to Hawke' s idea, the 
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Richard Woolcott 
visited eight regional countries for talks on the idea, and both Evans and 
Hawke visited the United States. They eventually gained the agreement 
(but not the support) of all nominated countries to participate in an 
exploratory meeting in Canberra in November 1989. ASEAN was the most 
hesitant about APEC, being suspicious of its intentions and concerned that 
ASEAN's role would be diminished in such a region-wide organisation. By 
this time, China, Hong Kong and Taiwan had been excluded. This was due to 
the political difficulties of including the latter two non-sovereign 
states, as well as China's unpopularity as a result of its supression of 
student pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. 
Ultimately, twelve countries participated in the Canberra meeting: 
Australia, New Zealand, the ASEAN six (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Brunei, Thailand and the Philippines), South Korea, Japan, the United 
States and Canada. Between them they sent 27 Ministers and 211 delegates 
and observers. 
The four agenda items explored at the APEC meeting were broad and 
· encompassed world and regional economic developments, the role of the 
region in global trade liberalisation, opportunities for regional co-
operation in specific areas, and future steps for co-operation (Joint 
Statement 1989). Reiterating their opposition to a trading bloc, the 
Ministers' Joint Statement emphasised the most obvious agendum, in their 
agreement to attempt to jointly advance the present round of multilateral 
trade negotiations as consistent with regional interests. To this end 
they agreed to consult closely and relevant ministers will meet twice 
before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. The achievement of a regional 
perspective on the Uruguay Round is in itself a significant 
accomplishment. 
The other major point made was the recognition of ASEAN's contribution, 
and its dialogue relations, to the development of APEC, and the 
significant future role that ASEAN can play. Left unresolved were the 
political questions of the institutional form and ultimate membership of 
APEC (which will be examined in detail below). 
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The Joint Statement was supported by the Chairman's Statement, which did 
not reflect the complete positions of all countries (Evans 1989c). This 
elaborated on the objectives for APEC. Apart from the desire to 
strengthen the multilateral system, as already mentioned, other objectives 
included co-operating with regard to the prospects for, and obstacles to, 
increasing trade and investment, through the identification of a range of 
practical economic interests. Accelerated development in the currently 
less developed parts of the region was seen as a priority, as was the need 
for better information on trade patterns and trade development, together 
with capital flows. An improvement of this data was deemed a priority, in 
order to take advantage of regional opportunities. The specific areas 
determined for further co-operation emphasised investment, technology 
transfer and human resource development. Specific sectors, such as 
telecommunications, transport and tourism, were also targeted. Therefore 
it is obvious that APEC's stated objectives are consistent with the three 
regional co-operative objectives identified earlier. 
Evans (1989c) also outlined nine principles of APEC on which substantial 
agreement had been obtained. These recognised the diversity of the region 
and highlighted the aim of informal consultation incorporating open 
dialogue and consensus. The focus is to be on economic areas where 
members have common interests, in order to strengthen the gains from 
interdependence. Also stated was the aim to complement, not detract from, 
existing organisations. This seems explicitly directed at the PECC and 
ASEAN, especially the latter. The option of extending membership to 
others was left open. 
The APEC meeting was generally hailed as a success, embodying a "rare 
sense of collective determination ... tempered with great caution" (Far 
Eastern Economic Review 1989 plO). Drysdale (1989 p19) emphasised its 
importance by saying that APEC "signifies an important change in gear". 
The impetus for regional co-operation is building, but do the APEC 
objectives accurately reflect the interests of the participating nations? 
Universal agreement was only achieved on the fairly obvious agendum of 
furthering multilateral co-operation, although this of course is a notable 
achievement. The really hard issues, such as those concerning structural 
adjustment, have necessarily been left for later. If the differing 
political agenda underlying this latest effort to co-operate can be 
determined, along with the compatibility of such agenda, an effort can be 
made to assess the feasibility of APEC and its implications for the 
regional co-operative process. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REGIONAL FORCES: COUNTRY SPECIFIC 
POLITICAL AGENDA 
The political agenda underlying the move towards Asia-Pacific economic co-
operation are complex and find their expression in the various responses 
to the APEC forum. These responses are predicated on a particular set of 
circumstances unique to each country or group of countries involved. The 
motivations of the United States, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Canada 
and New Zealand will be examined individually. The ASEAN political agenda 
will not be examined on a country specific basis, rather as a composite 
position, appropriate to its group participation in APEC. 
Each participant's position will be compared to the three general 
objectives for regional co-operation identified in Chapter Three. These 
objectives are: 
l.the co-ordination of economic activities and policies in the pursuit of 
greater regional trade and development gains; 
2. the establishment of regional economic information bases and the 
communication and exchange of this information in order to facilitate 
objective one; and 
3. the attempt to respond to the perceived limits of multilateralism, 
especially in dealing with Asia-Pacific issues. 
In order to carry out this examination, it is necessary to first highlight 
salient points of the general regional political and security situation, 
which affect regional countries' responses to APEC. 
The Regional Political-Security Situation 
When examining Asia-Pacific economic co-operation, four key political 
factors must be acknowledged as providing the context for regional co-
operation. By far the most important factor is the pivotal role of the 
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United States-Japan relationship in the trade and economic development 
potential of the region. In addition, the security dimension of Asia-
Pacific relations is important, with the regional network of alliances and 
alignments providing a largely pro-Western context. The role of the 
Soviet Union and the significance of China must also be examined, as they 
are key regional strategic participants. 
As Drysdale and Garnaut (1989) point out, Pacific countries' trade 
revolves around the management of relations between the United States and 
Japan, with a focus on the serious imbalances between the two. Japan's 
US$49 billion trade surplus with the US contrasts with the United States' 
dependence on Japanese capital to finance its economy. Yet, as Mansfield 
(1989 p3), the former US Ambassador to Japan, states, this relationship is 
the "most important bilateral relationship in the world" as together they 
produce almost 40 % of the world's GNP. 
However, tensions over the United States-Japan trade imbalance are 
increasing and have the potential to damage third parties. This would 
adversely affect the interests of Asia-Pacific countries, especially as 
specific trade issues are beginning to dominate overall policy approaches 
(Drysdale 1990). The United States' has involved Japan in a series of 
bilateral actions, in an effort to gain significant domestic structural 
reforms in Japan, in order to rectify the trade imbalance. Japan has been 
targeted under the United States' "Super 301" trade act in what has been 
termed "crowbar trade policy" (Financial Review 1989c). Japan refuses to 
recognise "Super 301" and says it will not negotiate under the threat of 
unilateral retaliation (Awanohara 1990a). 
However, both have been negotiating under the United States' initiated 
"Structural Impediments" talks (Awanohara 1990b, Financial Review 1989f). 
These talks have been largely an attempt to head off US congressional 
pressure for punitive trade action against Japan. Japan has made 
substantial concessions as a result, agreeing to deregulate its retail 
system, enforce anti-trust laws and increase spending on infrastructure 
(Canberra Times 1990). Yet the Japanese resent the expected diversion 
from successful domestic growth policies in order to rectify a trade 
imbalance they believe is essentially caused by the United States 
(Yoshitomi 1988) This is illustrated by Japan's overall declining trade 
surplus, which does not show a proportionate decline in its surplus with 
the US (Australian 1990d). As a result, Japan has its own complaints 
about the US (see Awanohara 1990b), which were only partly responded to in 
the Structural Impediments talks (Canberra Times 1990). 
30 
There is an important security dimension to the United States-Japan 
relationship. The US is committed by a non-reciprocal treaty to defend 
Japan. Japan is an important part of the United States' global strategic 
concept of forward defence, as well as important to the security of the 
Asia-Pacific region through its hosting of US forces. However, the growth 
of Japan's economic power relative to that of the United States has 
ensured a debate about defence burden sharing and consequent power 
sharing. Technology transfer is also at issue, not just in military 
terms, and is likely to remain an issue despite trade imbalances, as Japan 
provides increasing competition in areas traditionally dominated by US 
high technology industries. 
However, constraints on Japan's military share of the burden arise from 
its constitution, its non-nuclear principles and the internal debate over 
the role of military power (Auer 1988, Nishihara 1988). An increase in 
Japanese Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) is seen as part of the 
solution to burden sharing, as it would enhance Western security by 
providing economic support to allies. 
threats, especially that from the 
evaluation of the defence alliance. 
However, changes in perceptions of 
Soviet Union, may lead to a re-
For Japan, security is seen in much 
broader terms than merely defence: "comprehensive security" includes 
economic, energy and resource security as well. 
These problems are further compounded by cultural frictions and the 
This is especially respective populations' 
apparent in the surge 
although "revisionists" 
perceptions of each other. 
of anti-Japanese feeling in the United States, 
in both countries are challenging the previously 
benign impressions of each other (Awanohara 1990a). 
The United States-Japan relationship is crucial for the Asia-Pacific 
region as the two countries comprise the major trading partners of most in 
the region. Market access to both is a concern, with fears of increased 
protectionism in the United States as a response to Japan, or increasingly 
managed bilateral trade, with detrimental effects on third parties. In 
security terms, there are regional fears of a Japan which is de-linked 
from the United States. Therefore it is important to involve both in 
regional co-operation. 
Thus, security is the second key factor in the examination of the 
political agenda of countries involved in APEC. Whilst the United States' 
military guarantee has underwritten the economic security of the region, 
its Asia-Pacific strategic policy is very much part of its global 
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strategic posture, linking the region with United States' commitments to 
Europe. As Harris (1990) argues, Western security policy has centred on 
the European theatre, and policy toward the Asia-Pacific region has been 
seen in terms of this, and the containment of communist states. However, 
global political change, accompanied by a perceived decrease in the Soviet 
threat, may necessitate rethinking of assumptions underlying regional 
security. 
As Gilpin (1989) points out, the global struggle for power is now shifting 
to the economic realm where the number of significant players increases. 
In this way, United States' military alliances in the region, essentially 
of a bilateral nature, may face decreasing relevance. In addition, there 
is a regional lack of agreement on the nature of security threats, and 
large differences in power and capabilities (Palmer 1987). This in turn 
translates into a reluctance to form regional security oriented 
organisations, and a dependence on the US to provide regional security. 
Formal alliances exist between the United States and: Japan, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Australia. Malaysia and Singapore are linked to 
Australia and New Zealand through the Five Power Defence Agreement. The 
network of pro-Western alignment is an ongoing, but not entirely tension-
free one, although the United States' military presence is generally 
perceived as beneficial to the Asia-Pacific region. However, the US is 
demonstrating a desire to scale down defence commitments and increase 
burden sharing with allies which is of concern within the region. A 
possible US defence withdrawal heightens fears of a res1.1ltant power vacuum 
which either Japan or China may fill. 
Perceptions of security differ and the Asian countries' perceptions are 
characterised by a much broader concept than sheer military might. 
Japan's idea of 
for the ASEAN 
"comprehensive security" was outlined above. Similarly, 
countries, security is seen in terms of "national 
resiliance" - the planned mobilisation of social, ideological, economic 
and security forces to maintain the integrity of the state (Buszynski 
1987). ASEAN's position is that of maintaining territorial status quo and 
excluding the involvement of external powers from the region (principles 
which Vietnam violated in Cambodia). Therefore, Indochina and possible 
conflict with China over the Spratley Islands remain concerns. ASEAN has 
also been concerned with containing the advance of communism and is 
generally aligned with the United States. As such, ASEAN provides the 
cornerstone of US South-East Asia security policy (Alagappa 198 9) . 
However, Indonesia and Malaysia are non-aligned states, reflecting 
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changing perceptions of the utility of the United States' regional 
security presence. ASEAN fears being undermined in its own sub-region, 
not only in security terms, but also in political terms. Its resultant 
fear of domination is a very important factor in the regional political 
situation. 
The Soviet Union, in turn, while being a key regional strategic player, is 
largely marginalised politically and economically. It has a substantial 
defence presence in North Asia, increasing its reliance on nuclear missile 
submarines in the Sea of Okhotsk as part of its global deterrence 
strategy, and expanding forces in the Kurile Islands (Kreisberg 1989). 
Kreisberg (1989) interprets this as a counter to the United States' naval 
power in the area, rather than a malign regional intention. The Soviet 
Union also supports Vietnam and North Korea. As one Soviet writer points 
out, despite developments in Eastern Europe, "new political thinking" has 
had little effect on both Soviet and United States' military posture in 
the Asia-Pacific region (Ivanov 1990). 
However, a prime objective for the Soviet Union is to increase economic 
relations with the region, especially in the face of its own domestic 
economic problems. Offers of a withdrawal from Cam Rahn Bay may in part 
be aimed at de-emphasising its regional military presence, and overtures 
towards Japan appear to have primarily economic motives. The Soviet Union 
has also expressed an interest in participation in APEC. 
The fourth key regional factor is the role of China. China's programme of 
economic modernisation gives vast potential to the Chinese economy, and it 
already has significant economic links to the Asia-Pacific region. In 
addition, China has strategic importance. Its policy of political 
independence from the two superpowers puts it in an intentional position 
of "balanced ambiguity" (Chen 1989, Klintworth 1988). Despite the recent 
thaw in Sino-Soviet relations, China sees the US as a counter to the 
Soviet Union. The United States is also an important source of investment 
and technology, which China needs if it is to sustain its economic 
modernisation (Kreisberg 1989). In addition, China attempts to maintain a 
regional balance (Pye 1985). This regional security role is largely aimed 
at countering Vietnam, but Asian countries fear greater aspirations. This 
is especially salient, given China's military modernisation and 
development of a greater naval capacity. 
However, China is very interested in the economic, trade and technology 
benefits it could gain from the region, and the region in turn, especially 
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the NIEs, have interest in China's vast markets (Klintworth 1988). China 
desires improvement of its influence in the Asia-Pacific region and this 
is an important factor in the potential for Asia-Pacific economic co-
operation, and the responses of APEC countries to the issue of Chinese 
membership. 
Therefore these political and security issues are all important contextual 
factors for regional economic co-operation, which, although not 
specifically part of APEC' s agenda, may underlie and complicate the 
interest shown in such co-operation. Each country's motivations regarding 
APEC differ according to national interest. Therefore relevant political, 
economic and security factors will be considered for each participant in 
an attempt to determine the political agenda influencing Asia-Pacific 
economic co-operation, and the compatibility of such agenda with the 
stated objectives of APEC. 
The United States 
The United States is primarily a global power focusing on global political 
and military objectives, and this provides the essential context in which 
to view the US reaction to APEC. United States' foreign policy has yet to 
sharply focus on policy towards the Asia-Pacific, policy which is 
appropriate in a regional, rather than a global, context. 
As Kurth (1988 p27) points out: "although the United States is the primary 
power in the Pacific, it is not primarily a Pacific power." Kurth (1988) 
argues that as a global power, most United States' policy towards the 
Asia-Pacific region has been "initiated and shaped" by US policy to other 
areas of the world. Harris (1990) also highlights this, and argues that 
as a result of United States' foreign policy concentration on Europe, 
Asian issues are largely seen in terms of their European consequences and 
influenced by the Eurocentric East-West ideological divide. 
Existing US policy towards the Asia-Pacific region focuses on security in 
the context of US strategic interests. The United States is a maritime 
power, and US Naval Maritime Strategy underpins the security linkage 
between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region in the deterrence of global war 
(Kurth 1988). As Kreisberg (1989) argues, the idea of military 
containment still guides the United States' Asia-Pacific policy, but its 
military presence is an increasingly less effective mechanism for 
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maintaining US influence. The United States requires a redefinition of 
relations with the region, to increasingly focus on economic issues, as 
well as providing regional vision and leadership (Kreisberg 1989). 
However, the US appears slow to realise this and has yet to clearly focus 
on not only regional policy, but regional economic policy. 
Little serious consideration of Asia-Pacific economic co-operation was 
given prior to Drysdale and Patrick's OPTAD proposal in 1979. The Reagan 
years were then characterised by a concentration on American security 
relations, although the United States was an active member of the PECC. 
Interest in the idea was renewed in July 1988 with then Secretary of 
State, George Shultz, calling for a regional intergovernmental body of 
"like-minded countries" (Wanandi 1989b). Later in 1988 and again in 1989, 
Senator Bill Bradley called for the setting up of a Pacific coalition of 
industrialised countries (Wanandi 1989b, Financial Review 1989b). Also in 
1989, the Chairman of the Senate Sub-committee on Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, Senator Alan Cranston, proposed that the United States take the 
lead in the establishment of a regional forum to focus not only on 
economic issues, but security relationships as well (Wanandi 1989b, San 
Francisco Examiner 1989). Given that at this stage, the APEC idea was 
well on its way to culmination in a 1989 ministerial meeting, the lag in 
US regional policy is evident. 
However, there is some evidence that the United States is exhibiting a 
greater responsiveness to the Asia-Pacific region. In a speech supporting 
the concept of Asia-Pacific economic co-operation, the United States' 
Secretary of State, James Baker, told the New York Asia Society that the 
US was engaged in establishing a framework for a "new Pacific partnership" 
(Baker 1989a). Baker (1989a p2) stated: 
"To build that new partnership, we need continued American 
engagement in the region's politics, commerce and security. We 
need a more creative sharing of global responsibility with Japan. 
And we also need a new mechanism to increase economic co-
operation throughout the Pacific Rim." 
In this speech, Baker emphasised the United States-Japan partnership as 
fundamental to any Pacific co-operation framework. This seems to support 
the perception that the United States' involvement in APEC, to a large 
degree, revolves around economic imbalances with Japan. No doubt there is 
also a desire for a more influential American role in the region. Similar 
points were again repeated by Baker in a speech to the 1989 ASEAN Post 
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Ministerial Conference (Baker 1989b), but this time, ASEAN's importance to 
the US was emphasised. 
Increasing interest in the Asia-Pacific does reflect the changing 
relationship between the United States and the region. Although security 
concerns have had primacy in US regional interests, the relationship 
between it and Asia-Pacific countries has also been very much economic. 
This has been characterised by the American provision of major markets for 
Asian products, important in Asian economic growth. 
The United States' agenda in APEC seem mainly concerned with APEC's first 
objective and revolve around US trade imbalances with countries of the 
region. Contrasted with its own use of bilateralism and managed trade, 
the United States is concerned to ensure that regional economies remain 
open and that they increase measures aimed at liberalising their markets. 
The US points to trade barriers, which, if reduced, would facilitate the 
reduction of United States' trade deficits (Baker 1989c, Department of 
State Bulletin 1989). This is interesting in view of the likelihood that 
the United States' trade deficit with the region would worsen if there was 
reciprocal liberalisation. Liberalisation of US markets also stands in 
contradiction to the move in the United States towards increased 
protectionism. 
The US may also see APEC as providing a forum for dialogue and exchange of 
information in order to diffuse some of its trade disputes (especially 
with Japan and South Korea). This is compatible with APEC' s second 
objective. The multilateral format of APEC may be more acceptable to 
those involved, substituting for bilateral confrontation. The US has 
alienated a number of trading partners through its naming of unfair 
traders under "Super 301". This put China, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand on a "watch list" regarding intellectual property rights, with 
"special attention" given to Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines 
(Chanda 1989) . 
Through APEC, the United States also has an explicit concern with APEC's 
third objective: furthering Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN), 
specifically the Uruguay Round of the GATT. According to the Washington 
based Japan Economic Institute (JEI 1989), one motive for exploring 
regional co-operation is not only as a counterweight to EC trade strength, 
but as a clear message to the EC that the United States wants a useful 
outcome from the Uruguay Round. As the JEI (1989) speculates, APEC may be 
a way of indicating to the EC that the United States does have alternative 
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trading partners, and as such may be used as leverage in bargaining for 
trade concessions with the EC. Whatever the case, during the APEC 
meeting, senior US officials emphasised the major importance of the 
Uruguay Round and stressed the significance, Carla Hills, the US Trade 
Representative, places on this (United States Background Briefing 1989, 
Baker 1989d, New York Times 1989). 
In addition, two other factors influence US participation in APEC. 
Firstly, the United States, through APEC, may be attempting to redefine 
its role in the Asia-Pacific region and sketch out a more subtle 
leadership role, while preserving and maintaining its influence. The 
United States is very aware of the dangers of being perceived as 
dominating the forum. The United States is also aware that it needs to 
update its image of the Asia-Pacific region. It has been criticised as 
viewing the Pacific Rim "through a political-security prism", with US 
regional policy lacking coherence and commitment (Borthwick 1983, Krause 
1981). The focus has been on United States-Japan relations and there is 
now an attempt to broaden US influence. Re-evaluation of its regional 
role may have gained some impetus from the initial exclusion of the United 
States from the co-operation idea. 
There is also an ideological component to the US position. The United 
States' believes its active participation is necessary to maintain the 
liberal international norms it has underwritten for so long. In 1983, 
George Shultz (1983) indicated that co-operation with the region was 
desirable in order to influence countries to share and maintain the 
American commitment to democratic values. Promoting US principles has 
always been seen as one way of advancing United States' leadership. 
Therefore there is a need for the United States to attempt to define a 
role for itself in a regional, rather than a global context, in the Asia-
Pacific. With fears that it may indeed become shut out of the region, the 
United States appears to be signalling its intention to remain a key 
player, but has yet to define its modified role. In the meantime, 
participation in APEC may satisfy the US need for closer co-ordination of 
economic policy with trading partners in order to resolve trade disputes. 
The agenda underlying the US participation in APEC can be seen as 
compatible with all three APEC objectives, but not limited to them. 
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Japan 
Japan's involvement in regional co-operation must also be seen in a global 
context, as Japan's continuing efforts to define an appropriate 
international role for itself will influence its involvement in Asia-
Pacific regionalism. Japan has historically been a major proponent of 
regional economic co-operation, with overwhelming regional economic 
interests, but the reconciliation of economic power, global aims and a 
regional role are necessary before Japan can make an unequivocal 
commitment to APEC. 
Japan is faced with an economy which will inevitably demand a more defined 
international role. Japan is the world's second largest economy, third 
largest trader and largest capital exporter (Drysdale 1990) . Japan's 
foreign policy, post-World War II, 
development and the achievement 
has given first priority to economic 
of not only military security, but 
importantly, economic, energy and resource security as well (Johnson 
1982). Yet as Drysdale (1990) points out, Japan's economic development 
policy has been so successful that some form of international economic and 
trade policy leadership is being demanded. 
This leads into the debate about whether Japan is capable of achieving 
complete or even limited international hegemony. Vogel (1986) concludes 
that Japan is capable of achieving only limited hegemony in the 
international system, as it is unlikely to become a military power, it 
lacks strong international support and has no clear vision of a new 
international trading order. Leaver (1989) however, criticises such 
conclusions as he believes such analyses leave out consideration of 
domestic political structures and new patterns of geopolitical 
accommodation, whilst concentrating on a model based on the United States' 
experience. This under ates the possibility of Japanese dominance (see 
Leaver 1989). 
However, the problem can be largely reduced to conflict and ambiguity 
within Japan about its international role. In 1986, the Maekawa 
Commission Report stated that Japan had two options regarding a world 
role: it could open up its economy, or it could adopt a "new isolationism" 
(Awanohara 1990a) . The conflict is between international pressure on 
Japan as an economic superpower to articulate a global vision, versus the 
interests and nature of the Japanese domestic economy. 
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Fujii (1989 p124), Japan's Ambassador to the OECD, believes that for 
Japan, the major challenge is "to accommodate itself to the international 
community as one of the world's major powers". This statement reflects 
the Japanese perception that it must comply with international 
expectations. Yet as Fujii (1989) argues, Japan does not seek to become a 
dominant political power, rather it desires to continue to consider issues 
independently. However, Fujii goes on to argue that this being so, Japan 
still needs to define its national interest and strengthen its ability to 
deal confidently with the rest of the world. He points out that the 
obstacles to this come not only from conflict between oriental and 
occidental values within Japanese society; but from international 
perceptions that Japan is a destructive element in the existing world 
system, resentment from World War II and concern that Japan will become a 
military superpower. 
Inoguchi (1986) has argued that Japan is a "supporter", with the goal of 
strengthening an international system led by the United States, but 
believes there is a need for Japan to broaden its outlook from national to 
global interests. Drysdale (1990) also argues along these lines, 
believing that Japan's foreign diplomacy is reactive, not proactive, in 
support of the United States. This is due to Japan's heavy dependence on 
the US and the fragmented nature of Japanese state authority, making 
adjustment to a world leadership role difficult. 
This stress on Japan's attempt to define an international role for itself 
is important as this attempt will have an impact upon Japan's interest in 
regional arrangements. Japan must consider that not only could 
involvement in regional arrangements in the Asia-Pacific conflict with 
tentative international aims, but Japan faces all the same problems 
regionally as it faces internationally. 
In addition, Japan's bureaucracy is often divided, and conflict between 
Japan's Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) often results in a confused or ill-
defined Japanese position. This has been the case with APEC, reflected in 
Japan's initially cautious response to Hawke's initiative, despite being a 
strong supporter of regionalism. 
There is however the obvious pragmatic interest in economic and trade co-
operation which APEC may sig~ify, and Japan's main agenda for 
participation are compatible with APEC's first and second objectives. The 
Asia-Pacific region is a major source of imports of food, raw materials 
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and energy, especially from Australia and ASEAN, and as such, is crucial 
to Japan's comprehensive security (Nihon Keizai 1989b, Gordon 1983, Kirby 
1983). ASEAN is one of the most important destinations for Japanese aid 
and investment, and is increasingly becoming a base for Japanese offshore 
manufacturing (The Economist 1989a, Steven 1988). APEC may be seen as a 
way of further developing confident and more integrated economic relations 
with these nations. 
Participation in a regional co-operation forum could also help Japan's 
planned reduction of its own, and the region's, dependence on the United 
States' market, through greater regional structural adjustment. This 
focuses precisely on APEC's first objective. Matsunaga (1989a), Japan's 
Minister for International Trade and Industry, stated this explicitly at 
the APEC meeting, and this motive was widely canvassed in the Japanese 
Press (for example Asahi 1989a, Nihon Keizai 1989a). Japan believes that 
even with enhanced liberalisation of its own market, it cannot substitute 
for that of the United States (Smith 1989). Japanese APEC Press 
Statements (Kondo 1989 a,b, c) emphasised this commitment to further 
liberalise markets, but not necessarily within the framework of APEC. 
This may reflect a Japanese wariness that APEC could provide a forum in 
which to further pressure Japan for domestic restructuring. Therefore 
facilitation and promotion of intra-regional trade is important for Japan. 
Indeed, at APEC, Matsunaga (1989a,b) announced concrete ideas in the areas 
of investment, technology transfer and human resource development, 
including the establishment of a data base. Japan focused on the need . for 
a greater transfer of technology throughout the region, and Matsunaga 
proposed co-operation in research and development, and the establishment 
of "technoparks" as indicative of Japan's willingness to contribute. In 
this way, the Japanese position on the practicalities of co-operation was 
more advanced than that of other participants. The Japanese press also 
emphasised this aspect (Asahi 1989b, Mainichi Daily News 1989a). 
Japan sees advantages in enhancing regional dialogue to deal with conflict 
and co-operation, especially with the United States, South Korea and 
ASEAN, and there was a perception in Japan that APEC could help alleviate 
current trade tensions (Asahi 1989b, Daily Yomiuri 1989). Japan therefore 
also supports APEC's second objective. APEC's third objective, that of 
responding to the regional limits of multilateralism, has received less 
attention, except in the Japanese press, which emphasised the advantages 
of co-operation in the Uruguay Round, as an end in itself and as a 
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response to the EC (Japan Times 1989, Mainichi Daily News 1989b, Nihon 
Keizai 1989b). 
Japan's position regarding APEC continues to have some ambiguity due to 
internal bureaucratic divisions between MITI and the MFA. This was 
illustrated by the respective ministers for each, Hikaru Matsunaga of the 
former, and Taro Nakayama of the latter, giving separate opening 
statements to APEC (see Matsunaga 1989a, Nakayama 1989). Nakayama (1989) 
took the broader view, stressing that regional co-operation must 
contribute to international development and the global free trade system. 
His priorities included a shared economic outlook and global issues, such 
as the environment. The MFA is wary of Japanese foreign diplomacy being 
perceived as concentrating only on economic issues and aiming at economic 
bloc building (Asahi 1989c, Smith 1989). 
However, as Drysdale (1988b) points out, Japan is also trying to define a 
regional role for itself. Despite Japan's prominent postion in the 
Pacific economy, it cannot presume to project Pacific interests without a 
framework of regional consultation, and indeed, is unlikely to want to. 
Japan stresses interdependence and shared responsibility, which may be 
partly a reaction to its perceived political isolation, not only 
regionally, but internationally. 
Awareness of regional concerns about Japanese domination of any co-
operative forum, and the importance of the Japan-United States 
partnership, meant that Japan was reluctant to participate in APEC unless 
the United States was included. Japan is also concerned about alienating 
regional states, especially ASEAN. It is therefore believed that Japan 
needs to take a low profile approach to economic diplomacy in the Asia-
Pacific and not impose its views. Perhaps through APEC, power in the 
region will be more diffuse, so bolstering Japan's confidence through the 
removal of its fear of isolation (Ries 1989). Japan also believes that it 
needs partners in order to realise its objectives and that political 
leadership, certainly in the Asia-Pacific region, needs to be shared. 
Therefore Japan's motives for participation in APEC still remain 
ambiguous, but are generally compatible with APEC's first two objectives. 
There is acknowledged enthusiasm for the potential economic gains and the 
contribution Japan can make to the development of the region. However, 
the uncertainty about Japan's global role is reflected in its regional 
involvement, and it appears that the Japanese themselves have not fully 
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defined their political motives for involvement in APEC. The APEC process 
may form part of this search for a suitable Japanese international role. 
ASEAN 
ASEAN's interest in APEC must primarily be seen in the context of ASEAN 
countries' emphasis on the importance and strength of their own 
organisation. ASEAN endeavours to attain "regional resiliance through the 
enhancement of the national resiliance of each member country" (Mochtar 
1989 p3), and its objectives emphasise the economic growth, social 
progress and cultural development of the sub-region, along with the 
promotion of regional peace and stability (ASEAN 1987). 
Whilst economic co-operation is the stated key aim of ASEAN (see ASEAN 
1987), it is political co-operation which has been of most significance to 
members, illustrated by ASEAN's successful adoption of a common position 
on Vietnam and Cambodia. In addition, ASEAN has a security dimension, 
with the declaration in 1971 of a desired Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in South-East Asia (Alagappa 1989). 
However, ASEAN now appears to be reorienting towards economic imperatives. 
According to Buszynski (1987), this adjustment may be necessary so that 
interest is retained in the organisation through the construction of a 
broader base through which to enhance ASEAN's regional role. Economic co-
operation within ASEAN has been limited, probably due to varying levels of 
development and similarity of products. However, in 1988, region-wide 
average real growth was 8% which reflects ASEAN's potential for economic 
expansion (Hay 1989). 
ASEAN's interest in APEC therefore, is a result of this renewed emphasis 
on economic objectives, tempered by the value it places on the ASEAN 
mechanism (Wanandi 1989b). As Wanandi (1989b pp8-9) states: 
"ASEAN has concluded for some time now that greater consultation 
and co-operation among Pacific economies would be useful for the 
region as a whole as well as for its individual countries", and 
"(f)rom ASEAN's perspective, economic relations and economic co-
operation have become matters of first priority." 
Yet ASEAN's interest in APEC is not without reservations and conditions. 
Both Malaysia and Indonesia were initially reluctant to participate, which 
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contrasted with the enthusiasm of Singapore and the disinterest of the 
Philippines. Due to such divisions within ASEAN, group participation 
under the ASEAN banner was perhaps easier than individual participation, 
which would have highlighted the differences in their positions. 
ASEAN's conditions for participation therefore found expression in six 
principles for co-operation (Wanandi 1989a,b, Alatas 1989a, Pinkyan 1989). 
These stressed the preservation of ASEAN's identity and cohesion, and the 
maintenance of its existing dialogue relations. There was an emphasis on 
equality and mutual benefit, taking account of differences in stages of 
development, in a forum that must strengthen the multilateral system. In 
addition, the f arum should encompass consultation and discussion, 
strengthening capacity for economic analysis, and identifying common 
interests which could then be projected into other multilateral fora. 
Lastly, the implementation of these principles should proceed gradually 
and pragmatically. 
ASEAN perceives that participation in APEC will bring obvious trade and 
development advantages. Although the countries within ASEAN differ as to 
economic partners and interests, there is a common desire to increase 
regional economic links and enhance regional prosperity. ASEAN's agenda 
therefore, were largely targeted on APEC's first objective. 
Statements by the various ASEAN ministers at APEC emphasised practical 
areas of economic co-operation which would enhance the development 
process. Malaysia's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hassan (1989a), 
suggested the need for greater investment and soft loans from the more 
developed countries, as well as technology and capital transfers. Hassan 
(1989a) and the Philippine Delegation (1989) also called on developed 
countries to source regional growth by increasing domestic demand and 
liberalising domestic markets. In addition, ASEAN has an interest in 
developing greater links between government and private sectors, 
especially as in Asia the latter play an important role in the formulation 
of economic policy (Castro 1984). 
A joint background paper by the ASEAN Delegation (1989) focused on the 
need to develop ASEAN's industrial sector, aimed at enhancing export led 
growth. There was a focus on the need for more research and development 
assistance, with the complaint that ASEAN citizens were only "efficient 
assemblers and packers". This was seen to be closely linked with the need 
for greater human resource development, and the offers by Japan and the 
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United States at the APEC forum should go some way towards alleviating 
these concerns. 
There was also a concern with APEC's third objective, with the expressed 
desire to maintain an open, multilateral trading system (Hassan 1989a,b, 
Siddhi 1989, Bolkiah 1989). This was especially emphasised by Singapore 
where strengthening the GATT and global trade are priorities (Lee 1989a). 
The value of collective bargaining was acknowledged by Indonesia's Junior 
Trade Minister, Soedrajat Djiwandono (Indonesia Times 1989). 
ASEAN countries attached a proviso to this multilateral objective, 
emphasising that contribution to APEC and the multilateral trading system 
should be commensurate with levels of development (Hassan 1989b). There 
is a view that developing nations should be given the opportunity to 
consolidate industries before having to give up trading privileges (New 
Straits Times 1989, Business World 1989). The Philippines especially 
supported this, expressing a preference 
described APEC as "somewhat marginal" to it 
for dealing bilaterally, 
(Daily Globe 1989). 
and 
In contrast to ASEAN's interest in APEC's first and third objectives, is 
the ASEAN fear that involvement in such a forum will diminish ASEAN's own 
sense of community and its achievements. The main anxiety is that of 
domination, especially by its major trading partners, Japan and the United 
States (Aznam 1989, Lee 1989b). This was also emphasised by the ASEAN 
Press (Antara 1989, Business Times 1989, Business World 1989, The Straits 
Times 1989). To be acceptable, APEC must be seen to extend ASEAN's role 
and activities, rather than diminish them. 
Connected with the fear of domination is the fear of being undermined, and 
this finds expression in the ASEAN offer for its organisation to be used 
as a basis for APEC. Alatas (1989a p7) proposed that APEC' s eventual 
institutional structure needed to "start with and to utilise the existing 
ASEAN mechanism ... appropriately modified, expanded and adapted to the 
agreed requirements and objectives." As Wanandi (1989b) states, ASEAN's 
confidence in co-operation largely depends on the institutional set-up of 
APEC, and an ASEAN based mechanism would reduce ASEAN anxieties. As 
Alatas (1989a) argued in his opening statement, ASEAN itself established 
the only regularised regional intergovernmental forum in 1984 in the form 
of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC). Therefore, implicit is 
the desire for acknowledgement of the importance of ASEAN's role in the 
regional process. 
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This question of institutionalisation was not resolved at the 1989 APEC 
conference, as in many ways, it revolves around the issue of leadership in 
the APEC forum. However, ASEAN's very strong position seemed to indicate 
that it would not participate unless its demands were met. Yet at the end 
of APEC, ASEAN was still a participant, so compromising its position. 
Although ASEAN countries comprise half the membership of APEC, they are 
individually small players and may realise that the potential gains from 
APEC necessitate some compromise. Yet for ASEAN countries, the manner in 
which compromise happens is very important and such cultural differences 
within APEC need to be recognised to enable its smooth functioning. As 
Singapore's Minister for Trade and Industry, Lee (1989b pS) pointed out: 
"how you present an issue is as important as what is inside the package." 
These fears reflect ASEAN's concern about internal cohesiveness, largely 
due to the diminished importance of its perceived unifying cause of 
Cambodia, and evidence within ASEAN of a divergence in political, economic 
and security interests (see Aznam 1989). Sopiee (1990) believes it is 
imperative to strengthen ASEAN and indeed, Pacific co-operation could 
provide a new rallying point . ASEAN believes it cannot afford to let its 
solidarity weaken as it has a greater collective, rather than individual, 
bargaining position (Sopiee 1990). 
ASEAN also fears that e x isting bilateral relationships may have to be 
relinquished if it participates in APEC. Of concern is ASEAN' s 
relationship with the EC, as it is ASEAN's third largest trading partner. 
Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Kwan Yew, has called for an increase in 
investment by Western Europe in ASEAN, to balance the influence of Japan 
(Australian 1990b). There is also the reported fear that political 
adjustment in Eastern Europe could result in the diversion of European aid 
from South-East Asia (Vatikiotis 1990, Weekend Australian 1990). APEC may 
be a useful counter to this. 
Another agenda for ASEAN concerns security. Indonesia and Malaysia are 
key members of the non-aligned movement, which appears to conflict with a 
role in a predominantly Western oriented economic forum. This may be 
explained by citing a perceived separation between security and economic 
concerns, which is not necessarily valid given ASEAN's security concept of 
"regional resiliance" which includes eco nomic, political and security 
factors. Non-alignme nt may also give rise to difficulties in deciding the 
membership of APEC, especially if political criteria are used (Aznam 
1989). It is p ossible that ASEAN' s involvement in APEC will mean 
compromising its p osition in other fora. 
Therefore it is apparent that ASEAN has approached APEC with caution, 
tempered by a very pragmatic interest in the economic benefits of such co-
operation, especially with respect to APEC's first and third objectives. 
However, ASEAN's complex agenda are not limited to these objectives, and 
include fears of being undermined and dominated, which will influence 
ASEAN's participation and the future viability of APEC. 
Australia 
Australia has a unique position among the countries involved in APEC, in 
that it initiated the APEC forum, and the agenda set for the first APEC 
meeting largely reflected Australian interests. There is an increasing 
linkage in Australia between economic and foreign policy, as Australia 
attempts to respond to changing international economic circumstances. As 
a small player, Australia recognises the importance of participation in 
multilateral bodies, as gains made in these are likely to be greater than 
gains made in the bilateral context. Enthusiasm for an Asia-Pacific 
regional body also reflects Australia's need for greater structural 
integration with the region, in recognition of the increasing importance 
of its economic and foreign relations with Asia. 
Australia's relative economic position, in terms of its share of world 
trade, is declining. This has been identified by Riggott (1987) as part 
of a process of Australian marginalisation in the world economy. Higgott 
(1987) describes the Australian economy as "small", "open" and 
"vulnerable", as dependence on primary products and raw materials exports 
makes it subject to all the influences of the global economy. The fact 
that Australia's international position has not deteriorated further is 
largely due to the growth of the Asia-Pacific region and its demand for 
raw materials. Australia is increasingly dependent on Asian markets, but 
in turn, is becoming less important to these trading partners. 
Australia's economic position appears largely due to domestic factors and 
the predominantly reactive nature of its international economic policy. 
As Stoeckel and Cuthbertson (1987) discuss, domestic policies impair 
international competitiveness. They, and also Hughes (1988), argue that 
wage and productivity policies need adjustment in order to decrease real 
wage costs to employers and to improve productivity. They believe that 
Australia needs to expand and improve its manufacturing base in the face 
of fluctuating commodity prices. Diversification of markets is important, 
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as is the development of new ones, and Australia has not taken advantage 
of the full potential of rapidly growing regional markets. Australia is 
also one of the most visibly protectionist of the industrialised 
countries, despite its support for, and reliance on, the principles of 
free trade {Hughes 1988). However, the use of non-tariff barriers is 
relatively low. Garnaut { 19 8 9 p2 3) , in his report to the Australian 
government on relations with North-East Asia, also emphasised that the 
removal of protection is necessary in order "to enhance export orientation 
and competitiveness", to take advantage of regional economic 
opportunities. 
Australia's agenda for regional co-operation focus mainly on APEC's first 
two objectives. Australia's interest in APEC seems to rest on the idea 
that in the long term, Australia could improve its economic performance by 
increasing its interdependence with the region: in the form of information 
exchange, policy co-operation, co-operation with regards to structural 
change and co-ordination in a variety of other areas {Harris 1989b) . As 
Michael Duffy {1989a), then Minister for Trade Negotiations, pointed out, 
it has taken Australia a long time to realise the "unparalleled 
opportunities" the Asia-Pacific region has to offer. 
Within Asia are found Australia's fastest growing markets. Already, the 
region accounts for two thirds of Australia's imports and exports, half of 
the foreign investment in Australia, and three fifths of Australia's 
overseas investment {Hawke 1989a). However, Australia's ability to take 
advantage of regional opportunities will depend on its ability to 
institute domestic reform and diversify the composition of trade in order 
to satisfy Asian demand {National Australia Bank 1989, Hughes 1988). This 
has been acknowledged by Minister Duffy {1989a), who believes Australia's 
export profile needs to be more closely integrated with the demands of the 
Asia-Pacific market. Recent government reports target the NIEs, ASEAN and 
North-East Asia as crucial to Australia's strategic direction and 
commercial opportunities {Austrade 1989, 1988, Garnaut 1989, Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade 1988). Australia also wants to ensure that 
rapid regional growth is not hindered by protectionist policies or 
structural inflexibilities (Hawke 1989b). 
With respect to APEC's second objective, Australia has a stated interest 
in enhancing regional dialogue (Evans 1989b). Not only could dialogue 
help combat protectionist trends, but may also diffuse trade and economic 
tensions and constrain the bilateral power of larger nations (Duffy 1989b, 
Garnaut 1989). This could be helped by greater e x change of information on 
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policy and other economic matters. In addition, Garnaut (1989) argues in 
some detail that there is a great need for Australia to understand North-
East Asian social, economic and political institutions. This argument can 
be broadened to encompass the entire region and dialogue may enhance this 
mutual knowledge building process. 
Australia's agenda also focus on APEC's third objective. The cornerstone 
of Australia's foreign economic policy has long been its support for the 
GATT and the principles of a liberal trading order. As the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (1988) points out, as a small player, Australia 
cannot rely on economic or political leverage to project its trade 
interests and therefore must rely on international respect for the 
principles of the GATT. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Senator Gareth Evans (1989a pl8, 1989b), emphasises that the multilateral 
trade regime is the best system for Australia and states that "one of our 
very highest foreign policy objectives" is 
Uruguay Round of the GATT, especially in 
wants to build regional support for 
multilateral trading system (Duffy 1989b). 
the successful outcome of the 
agriculture. Australia also 
an open, non-discriminatory 
Australia believes that regional co-operation could result in an improved 
ability to project the region's interests in international fora through a 
collective bargaining position (Hawke 1989b, Woolcott 1989, McCarthy and 
Elek 1989) There is the perception that the interests of the Asia-
Pacific region have not been adequately represented in international fora, 
which tend to be dominated by the EC, North American and Latin American 
demands. Therefore, the most obvious place where a regional voice could 
be effective is in the current Uruguay Round . The APEC agreement to 
consult with regards to this achieved one of Australia's main short term 
objectives for regional economic co-operation. 
This focus on the importance of multilateralism for Australia finds 
further expression in Australia's leadership (along with Canada) of the 
Cairns Group of Agricultural Fair Trading Nations, in the quest for reform 
of global agricultural trade in the current Uruguay Round. Cooper and 
Higgott (1990) describe the Cairns Group as a vehicle for co-operation 
among coalitions of the weak, which in this case, encompasses economically 
and politically diverse countrie s . The Cairns Group has been successful 
in focusing the serious attention of the United States and the EC on 
negotiations over agricultural trade. In the context of regional economic 
co-operation, the middle power leadership of Australia in the Cairns Group 
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is important, as it has experienced success in the creation of a group 
consensus and the modification of the behaviour of larger powers. 
Whilst it is only a single issue coalition, Australia's experience in the 
Cairns Group perhaps helped to provide the confidence to explore the APEC 
idea with the region, and perhaps also gave more credibility to 
Australia's role in the initiation of APEC. The idea that Australia was 
ideally placed, in terms of being a middle and non-threatening power, to 
initiate APEC, enhanced APEC's chances of a successful first meeting. 
Prime Minister Hawke' s proposal for regional economic co-operation was 
predicated on his earlier proposal for co-operation with respect to 
projecting regional interests in the Uruguay Round (Department of Trade 
1984, 1985). As such, it was initially limited in its conception of 
regional co-operation which became obvious as the concept gained impetus: 
the terms of reference changed, the participation changed and the 
envisaged institutional form was altered. From an "OECD-type" Western 
Pacific economic organisation, a more flexible idea of a forum for co-
operation developed as consultations with regional countries commenced. 
However, the initiation of APEC has been an important part of Australia's 
attempt to define a regional political role. There is a fear of economic 
and political exclusion from the Asia-Pacific region as Australia's 
importance to others declines. As a result, Australia has proposed a 
series of initiatives in an attempt to establish a role for itself. 
Australia has been described by Jenkins (1983 p233) as a "link country", 
the status of which facilitates a pivotal role in regional consensus 
building. Yet Australia's role is probably not that obvious to countries 
of the region. Some view Australia's role in APEC with suspicion and see 
it as a result of a desire to exploit the growth potential of others 
without addressing domestic problems. The question becomes that of what 
Australia has to offer to the region. Australia's raw material wealth is 
obvious, but domestic practices limit further interest Asian countries may 
have in Australia. 
Yet despite these arguments, the APEC meeting did happen as a result of 
Australian efforts. Its significance is highlighted by a statement by 
Prime Minister Hawke (1989b p2) at APEC: "(t) his is the first time the 
region has met, as a region, to discuss the economic future of the 
region." A government level meeting of this scope had not previously 
taken place, and Australia rightly deserves credit. In addition, the 
matters discussed at APEC reflected Australia's economic agenda, agenda 
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which are 
challenge 
very much targeted on APEC' s three stated objectives. The 
for Australia is to maintain APEC interest in these initial 
agenda items and further consolidate its regional role. 
South Korea 
South Korea's role in APEC is also unique. It is classified as a Newly 
Industrialised Economy (NIE) and has a somewhat isolated international and 
regional position, lacking membership in any obvious grouping (such as the 
OECD or ASEAN) . South Korea has supported the APEC proposal since its 
inception on Prime Minister Hawke's visit to Seoul in January 1989, and 
its interest is founded on economic motives and the perceived need to 
improve dialogue with its trading partners. In addition, South Korea's 
desire for international recognition, somewhat tempered by the success of 
the Olympic Games in 198 8, is reflected in a desire for regional 
recognition as well. 
South Korea has experienced rapid economic growth to make it one of the 
regional trade surplus countries. However, it is now facing increasing 
competition from less developed nations as the latter concentrate on 
labour intensive exports. As a result, the structure of South Korea's 
domestic economy is changing, with pressure for increased wages leading to 
a need to improve productivity through greater automation and movement to 
higher levels of technology (Manila Chronicle 1989, Bridges 1988). In 
addition, South Korea faces protectionism in its key markets and pressure 
on itself to improve trade liberalisation measures. Together with 
economic change, South Korea is undergoing political change, and has been 
further described as a "newly democratising country" (Bridges 1988 p381). 
Providing a context for all these changes is South Korea's security 
situation and the lack of accommodation with North Korea. These security 
concerns underlie much of the dialogue South Korea undertakes, and are 
also reflected in its interest in membership of both regional and 
international organisations. 
South Korea has been very concerned with gaining international recognition 
of its economic power, which could dilute its enthusiasm for a regional 
economic organisation. Membership of the OECD has been an aim, which has 
to some extent been alleviated by improved and extended dialogue between 
the two. This concern with recognition is reflected in the regional 
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context, especially as South Korea no longer wishes to be as closely 
associated with the United States. The recent institution of a limited 
dialogue with ASEAN on trade, investment and tourism, goes a little way 
towards this. South Korea has long been an explorer of regional co-
operation, as one way of enhancing its economic and security situation to 
combat this sense of regional isolation, and APEC must be seen in this 
context (see Seung 1983, Han 1981a,b). 
South Korea does see very obvious economic advantages in participation in 
APEC, largely consistent with APEC' s first objective. South Korea is 
faced with protectionism in key European and United States' markets, and 
greater regional co-operation may be useful in diversifying its markets to 
lessen this dependence (Bridges 1988). As 70% of South Korea's trade and 
investment is with the Asia-Pacific region, it has had long term aims of 
decreasing the "excessive bilateralism" of regional relations and 
countering regional protectionism, although South Korea itself is still 
very protectionist (Choi 1989, Seung 1983). At APEC, various economic 
measures, especially technology related, were emphasised by South Korea's 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Choi Ho-joong (1989) and the Minister for 
Trade and Industry, Han Seung-soo (1989). 
However, one of the main motives for South Korean participation focuses on 
APEC's second objective, with specific reference to enhancing the process 
of regional dialogue in order to decrease bilateral trade tensions. 
Minister Han (1989) pointed to the problem of growing regional trade 
imbalances which require the adjustment of macroeconomic and trade policy, 
and which, he believed, could be decreased by standardised information on 
regional economies and the exchange of this information. 
Bilateral trade frictions are the major concern for South Korea as it is 
in conflict with its two largest trading partners, Japan and the United 
States. South Korea has been experiencing a trade deficit with Japan, 
which further complicates relations between the two, as complex emotional 
tensions and suspicion already exist (see Bridges 1988). South Korea 
wants to reduce its reliance on the supply of Japanese machinery and 
goods, whilst complaining about Japan's reluctance to transfer high 
technology. In addition, US pressure on Japan to play a greater role in 
regional security, especially that of South Korea, places added strains on 
the South Korea-Japan relationship. 
over the United States' regional role. 
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South Korea is wary of Japan taking 
The greatest friction South Korea experiences is with the United States. 
US pressure on South Korea to improve trade liberalisation is designed to 
reduce the latter's bilateral trade surplus. South Korea was to be put on 
the United States' list of unfair traders under "Super 301 ", until last 
minute concessions avoided this (Chanda 1989a,b). Instead South Korea has 
been singled out as a US priority target in telecommunications (Chanda 
1989a) . The growing trend to anti-Americanism in South Korea is also 
influenced by frictions in the security relationship, as the US seeks to 
withdraw some of its forces despite opposition from South Korea (Clifford 
1990) . 
Therefore APEC seems attractive as a forum where trade tensions may be 
diffused and a multilateral approach may prove more effective than direct 
bilateral confrontation. In addition, South Korea believes it needs to 
improve dialogue and information exchange with others in the region, 
especially ASEAN (Choi 1989). 
There is also a focus on APEC's third objective, with South Korea stating 
that it would like to see an improved GATT and a successful conclusion to 
the Uruguay Round (Choi 1989, Han 1989, Korea Herald 1989b). 
Security plays a part in South Korea's political agenda, and Minister Choi 
(1989) stated explicity that he hoped APEC would be useful in .promoting 
peace, as well as prosperity, in the region. There would undoubtedly be 
indirect security benefits from participation in APEC, through the 
broadening of regional ties. In addition, South Korea has been 
endeavouring to improve ties with communist countries, and regional 
economic co-operation may be seen as bringing about easier access. South 
Korea is very aware that its strategic position is intertwined with the 
regional and global interests of the Soviet Union, the United States, and 
perhaps even China, and therefore such concerns must inevitably permeate 
its foreign relations (Bridges 1988). 
At the APEC meeting in November 1989, Foreign Minister Choi proposed that 
the third meeting of APEC be held in Seoul (Korea Herald 1989a). This can 
be seen as illustrative of the interest South Korea has in enhancing the 
process of economic co-operation. In its unique position in the Asia-
Pacific region, South Korea's agenda is targeted mainly on APEC's first 
and second objectives. It does however have the additional agenda of 
underlying security concerns, and a quest for regional and international 
recognition of its increasing economic power. 
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Canada 
For Canada, the APEC forum provides an opportunity to improve and 
consolidate relations with the Asia-Pacific region, in an ongoing attempt 
to establish itself as a Pacific power. Canada's participation in APEC 
also has to be seen in the context of its economically dependent 
relationship with the United States, which takes 80% of its exports, as 
well as the emphasis it places on the GATT. Canada has not been very 
involved in nurturing regional co-operation and its participation can 
perhaps be seen as a formality, in recognition of its economic status. 
Canada's perceptions of the importance of the Asia-Pacific region are 
changing, resulting in a greater attempt to establish itself as a 
legitimate actor in the region. In 1981, MacGuigan (1981) argued that 
there was need for a greater awareness of the Pacific Rim and that Canada 
needed to recognise that it was both an Atlantic and Pacific power. In 
1989, Canada was being criticised by its own press as being a "bit late in 
waking up to the importance of the region" (Financial Times of Canada 
1989). At APEC, Minister Crosbie (1989b) acknowledged the importance of 
the Asia-Pacific region to Canada's economic development and the need to 
ensure sustained regional economic growth. This is illustrated by the 
fact that the Asia-Pacific region accounts for 50% of Canada's non-United 
States trade (Kilpatrick 1989). 
Mccloskey ( 198 9), Assistant Deputy Minister for External Affairs and 
International Trade, believes APEC gives Canada a part in the regional 
process of co-ordination of economic and trade policy, which it otherwise 
would not have. Canada wants to participate more closely in the 
anticipated continued growth of the region and therefore is interested in 
enhancing its links with it. In particular, Canada's interests lie in co-
operation in fisheries, agriculture, services and dispute settlement 
(Crosbie 1989c,d). These aims are consistent with APEC's first objective, 
despite the lack of practical development of Canada's position. 
However, the main emphasis 
multilateral trade negotiations 
of Canada's APEC statements concerns 
(see Mccloskey 1989, Crosbie 1989a,b,d,e), 
also reflected in the Canadian Press (Financial Times 1989, Globe and Mail 
1989, Vancouver Sun 1989). This emphasis on multilateralism may reflect 
the fact that Canada is still in the process of reorienting to the Asia-
Pacific region, and as such has not fully determined its agenda for 
regional economic co-operation. However, it was Canada's suggestion that 
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APEC ministers meet prior to the final session of the Uruguay Round, 
arguing that the Uruguay Round is the best hope to sustain regional 
economic growth (Crosbie 1989e, Mccloskey 1989) As Kilpatrick (1989 p6) 
points out, a multilateral trading system, based on the GATT, is the 
"cornerstone of Canada's international trade policy." 
Connected with this is the underlying Canadian agenda of coalition 
building for greater international impact. Canada's position parallels 
that of Australia in its recognition of the efficacy of a combined voice, 
having been involved in the Cairns Group and its promotion of an improved 
bargaining position (see Cooper and Riggott 1990). Therefore Canada has 
an explicit interest in APEC's third objective, with the concern that the 
Asia-Pacific region could have a stronger voice in international fora. 
Minister Crosbie (1989b pl) stated that: 
"Asia-Pacific countries need to exercise greater leadership and 
responsibility in international economic fora to reflect their 
rising economic status and to ensure (that) their priorities and 
circumstances are taken into account." 
Therefore Canada perceives benefits of being part of a forum that may 
improve not only its regional role, but also its international position. 
Canada's agenda for APEC do focus on APEC's third objective, largely due 
to an inadequately defined position on regional economic co-operation. 
Canada has not yet fully explored the potential of greater co-ordination 
of economic activities and policies with regional countries, and APEC may 
form part of the process of reorientation to the Asia-Pacific region. 
Canada has also yet to explore the implications of APEC for its other 
economic, political and security interests. 
New Zealand 
New Zealand's participation in APEC can be seen mainly in the context of 
New Zealand's interests in enhancing its economic links with the Asia-
Pacific region, as well as in furthering the Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations. Although always an active participant in Asia-Pacific 
co-operation, New Zealand also does not appear to have fully explored the 
potential benefits of a government level co-operative process. 
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New Zealand's economic priorities revolve around the close association 
with Australia, in the form of the Closer Economic Relations (CER) 
Agreement (Lange 1989, Wilde 1989). Mike Moore (1989a p16), Minister for 
External Relations and Trade, describes CER as "an outward looking 
arrangement, specifically intended to facilitate greater economic 
engagement by both countries with the rest of the world." New Zealand has 
long concentrated on its relationship with Australia, the United States 
and the EC, but there is a growing acknowledgement that New Zealand must 
further diversify its economic relations to take advantage of 
opportunities in the region, which is the destination for 70% of New 
Zealand's exports (Moore 1989a, New Zealand High Commission 1990). 
New Zealand sees its participation in APEC as supporting the development 
and structural adjustment of the region, consistent with APEC's first and 
second objectives. It concentrates on areas of practical co-operation of 
importance to New Zealand: information sharing, sectoral issues and 
fisheries management (New Zealand High Commission 1990). The latter also 
reflects New Zealand's adopted role of defending the interests of Pacific 
Island nations in the APEC forum. Australia sees itself in a similar 
role. In addition, New Zealand perceives advantages in a multilateral 
approach to regional trade liberalisation, and sees a regional forum as a 
useful vehicle through which to conduct dialogue with the more 
protectionist NIEs (Moore 1989a). 
However, in his opening statement to APEC, Minister Moore (1989b) 
concentrated on the role of APEC in advancing trade liberalisation, 
especially in the current Uruguay Round. New Zealand has strong 
agricultural interests at stake and therefore sending a regional message 
to the Uruguay Round has become an imperative. As Moore (1989a pl) stated 
prior to the APEC meeting: 
"It is in the GATT that we see the best opportunities for our 
legitimate self-interest as New Zealanders." 
The New Zealand press has also speculated that APEC may be useful in 
sending a message to the EC about the seriousness of the Uruguay Round and 
as a warning to the rest of the world if the Round fails (Consolidated 
Press 1989, The Press 1989). This f ocus on APEC's third objective again 
reflects the perceived utility o f a collective bargaining position, to 
achieve influence which New Zealand otherwise would not have. 
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This concern is linked with New Zealand's focus on the institutional 
aspect to APEC. New Zealand places much value in the regional role of the 
PECC and its position within the PECC. Although Moore (1989a,b) has 
stated that the PECC is no longer adequate, with a need for greater 
government involvement, the New Zealand position is that the PECC should 
be linked with the APEC ministerial consultations. This emphasis may 
reflect New Zealand's already established and legitimised position in this 
institution and its uncertainty of an equivalent role in APEC. 
Therefore, New Zealand's agenda very much concentrates on APEC' s third 
objective, but are compatible with all three objectives. New Zealand is a 
small economy and perceives benefits in greater integration into such a 
dynamic region. With increased exploration of the APEC idea, New 
Zealand's position should achieve greater definition. 
however, that New Zealand will continue to remain 
supporter of APEC. 
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It is expected, 
an enthusiastic 
CHAPTER FIVE 
APEC INSTITUTIONALISATION AND PARTICIPATION 
There are two additional political agenda which are unresolved and will 
remain of concern to all APEC participants, although these agenda are 
unlikely to become obvious objectives. Concern as to APEC's institutional 
form will underlie APEC deliberations, as will the issue of participation 
in the APEC forum. 
The Institutional Form of APEC 
All APEC participants appear to universally endorse the ideas of 
informality, equity, consulation and gradual establishment as bases for 
APEC's ultimate structure. However, there are more concrete ideas as to 
APEC' s form, which encompass four major alternatives: an expansion of 
ASEAN, an expansion of the PECC, an OECD-type organisation, or a more 
informal arrangement emcompassing elements of all of the above. As Harris 
(1989c) points out, the cultural differentiation of the region will have a 
major impact on the form of APEC. Harris (1989c p18) believes that an 
important difference between Asia-Pacific nations is "that the relatively 
clear line that separates government, the private sector and, indeed the 
academic world in the West is not evident in the region." This places an 
immediate constraint on the institutional form of APEC. 
As discussed previously, ASEAN has proposed that APEC be based on an 
expanded and modified version of its own Post Ministerial Conference 
(Alatas 1989a, Wanandi 1989a,b). Wanandi (1989a,b) elaborates on this 
idea by suggesting that participation in the PMC would need to be 
expanded, the conference agenda broadened and the format changed. The 
latter would have to move from a series of "six plus one" meetings to a 
multilateral composition. In addition, the ASEAN PMC has been primarily a 
political meeting, so economic ministers would also have to be included. 
Finally, Wanandi believes, the ASEAN Secretariat could be strengthened and 
stronger research support added. 
ASEAN quite obviously has its own agenda underlying this proposal, as has 
been discussed previously. However, a major problem with the ASEAN format 
is that the EC is included, which is incompatible with the idea of co-
operation restricted to the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, New Zealand 
has indicated that it would not want to see the APEC process "captured" by 
any particular country or group (New Zealand High Commission 1990); and 
the Canadian press reported Canada as "not keen" on ASEAN playing a 
pivotal role (Ottowa Citizen 1989). However, the sensitivities of ASEAN 
need to be considered, and the 1989 APEC meeting neither endorsed nor 
dismissed the proposition. 
Also proposed has been the expansion of the PECC to incorporate the 
concerns of APEC. The tripartite character of the PECC has been described 
as "an important institutional innovation meeting the special 
characteristics of the region" (Harris 1989c p18). The PECC does have 
the support of member governments and much of its work is policy oriented. 
Therefore it could be conceived as an appropriate starting point for 
intergovernmental consultations. Indeed, the PECC offered itself as the 
basis of the proposed new co-operative group during its meeting in April 
1989 (Edwards 1989b,c). 
The role of the PECC in the stimulation of the idea of Asia-Pacific 
economic co-operation cannot be underestimated. Yet there is also the 
argument that the PECC was successful because governments were not ready 
for more formal co-operation, so decreasing the PECC's relevance in this 
context (Wanandi 1989b) . Yet Wanandi (1989b) believes that the PECC's 
role cannot be substituted, and that whatever 
adopted, the PECC will play an important role. 
institutional option is 
This view appears to be 
echoed in Australia, New Zealand and Canada (Harris 1989c, Moore 1989a,b, 
Crosbie 1989b). The PECC certainly has the potential to play an important 
support role but seems unlikely to be adopted as APEC' s institutional 
form. 
Prime Minister Hawke' s (1989a) original proposal was for an OECD-type 
organisation. This idea has now been largely dismissed, although the 
value of a regional institution which would produce analyses of economic 
policy could be great. The OECD, however, is a bureaucratic organisation 
aimed at regular surveillance of its members' performances, and guided by 
the common commitment to the value of liberal, market-oriented economies 
(Rowley 1989c, Harris 1989c). Harris (1989c) argues that the agreement on 
such common objectives among the diverse membership of an Asia-Pacific 
body would be very difficult, and an institution which works for advanced 
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industrialised countries would not necessarily be appropriate for the 
Asia-Pacific region. The formality of an OECD-type institution appears to 
be inappropriate to the process of consultation as envisaged in the Asia-
Pacific context, as the exploration of co-operation eschews a formal, 
structured mechanism. The scope for informal consultation needs to be 
maintained, whatever the form. 
The fourth alternative for APEC is much less structured and appears to be 
the way APEC is currently evolving. According to Stuart Harris, an 
informal "sherpa" type arrangement, such as exists with respect to the 
London Economic Summit, seems to be more appropriate in this context. In 
this way, the country which hosts each meeting acts as a "shepherd" for 
the rest, in terms of making the necessary arrangements and directing 
consultations in order to set the agenda for each meeting. After the 
conclusion of each meeting, the task of "shepherd" is then passed onto the 
country in which the next meeting will be held. The first APEC meeting 
then, can be seen in terms of Australia's efforts, with the leadership for 
the next meeting now having been passed to Singapore. This type of 
informal arrangement leaves scope for input not only from each country, 
but from organisations such as the PECC and ASEAN, as well as drawing on 
them actively for research or administrative support. 
This last option perhaps best suits the very new process of Asia-Pacific 
governmental regional co-operation and avoids the issue of formalising the 
process until a greater consensus on APEC's structure can be established. 
Regional co-operation needs to be seen as an evolving process, and 
confining it to a particular institutional format at this stage may hinder 
its evolution. However, the institutional form of APEC was made an issue 
by ASEAN at the 1989 meeting, and can be expected to remain an important 
underlying agenda item during APEC consultations. It is very much a 
political issue which draws on the varying country-specific agenda and 
provides a challenge to APEC at this early stage of co-operation. Whether 
the issue can be dealt with successfully will influence the future 
viability of APEC. 
Participation in APEC 
The second political issue which has not yet been resolved concerns 
participation in the APEC forum. This issue rests on the question of what 
constitutes the Asia-Pacific region and which countries should be included 
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in it. This can be separated into geographical, political/ideological and 
economic arguments, which in turn are interlinked. 
From the geographical viewpoint, does the Asia-Pacific region encompass 
all countries which rim the Pacific Ocean, and if not, why not? Does the 
region include not only countries which rim the Pacific, but also those 
within it? Is there a minimum geographical size? In turn, there are 
political arguments. Should the membership of APEC be confined to 
democracies? How to define democracy? Are there ideological divisions? 
Should communist states be included? Is APEC an opportunity for different 
ideologies to communicate, as it is an opportunity for communication 
between diverse cultures. Economic arguments centre on whether 
participation should be confined to market oriented economies wit .h 
extensive regional links (as suggested by Crawford and Seow 1981, Drysdale 
and Patrick 1979). Should there be a minimum level of economic 
development or economic size? Or is APEC an opportunity for communication 
between differing economies? 
These questions have not been answered and countries currently 
participating in APEC have differing views. In its original conception, 
Prime Minister Hawke saw APEC partly as an opportunity to meet the 
challenge of integrating socialist countries into the international 
economic order (Hawke 1989b). This is consistent with the existing PECC 
arrangements, where both free market and centrally planned economies 
participate. The United States, however, proposed that participation 
should be limited on the basis of existing economic links to the region, 
which would exclude communist nations, Latin America and the Pacific 
micro-states. ASEAN also, seems to be favouring this idea, perhaps 
because the non-alignment of Indonesia and Malaysia would make it 
difficult to justify exclusion on the basis of ideology. In turn, South 
Korea is trying to improve relations with communist states and presumably 
would not object to their involvement. 
There is also the question of whether China, Hong Kong and Taiwan should 
be included. China's participation seemed confirmed at the same time as 
that of the United States and Canada (Edwards 1989a). However, with the 
suppression of student uprisings in early June 1989, China's participation 
was suspended. If these events had not occurred, it is unlikely that 
regional countries would have had problems with China's inclusion. China 
certainly has the economic links to the region, despite differing in its 
economic structure, and ideology. 
official political links with China. 
However, not all in the region have 
Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei do 
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not have diplomatic ties, although Indonesia's relations with China will 
be normalised later in 1990 (Aznam 1989, Australian 1990c). The United 
States, Canada and Australia all support the inclusion of not only China, 
but Hong Kong and Taiwan as well (Baker 1989a, Hong Kong Standard 1989b, 
Crosbie 1989b, Grigson 1989). Japan supports Hong Kong's inclusion, but 
sees that of China as premature (Hong Kong Standard 1989a, Clark 1989) 
ASEAN seems ambivalent to the participation of all three (Byrnes 1989). 
China itself would like to be included, although regional co-operation 
would still be subordinant to global aims (Chen 1989). China would not 
necessarily want to exclude Hong Kong and Taiwan, rather it desires 
recognition of its status as the only "legitimate" Chinese state (Edwards 
1989d) . It is obvious that Hong Kong and Taiwan have extensive economic 
links to the region, and commitment to a market economy, but their non-
sovereign status raises political issues. This is especially so with 
respect to Hong Kong and the ambiguity of its status from 1997, yet it is 
a member of the GATT and an exemplary free trader. Taiwan, in turn, has 
exhibited an impressive economic performance and is becoming a significant 
regional investor (Byrnes 1990). China's sensitivities need to be taken 
into account and perhaps could be overcome through an arrangement similar 
to the PECC, where the issue of names was resolved (see Woods 1988), or 
such as in the GATT, where China is an official observer and Taiwan, an 
unofficial observer (Rees 1989). 
The inclusion of other countries also needs to be considered. The Soviet 
Union regards itself as a Pacific power, obvious in President Gorbachev's 
Vladivostok speech on 28 July 1986. The Soviet Union also has observer 
status at the PECC and is active in the PECC's task forces. In May 1989, 
the Soviets called for their inclusion in any discussion of the region's 
economic future (Scott 1989). However, the Soviet Union has currently 
limited economic links to the region, is a centrally planned economy and 
has a communist ideology. Although the development of Siberia has 
potential, it is unlikely that the Soviet Pacific coast will exert 
substantial economic influence on the region (Garnaut 1989). This has not 
prevented the Soviet Union from continuing to call for improved economic 
relations with the Asia-Pacific region, especially due to the growing 
Soviet perception that economic security is at least as important as 
military security (Ivanov 1990, Meredith 1990, Australian 1990a, Soviet 
News Bulletin 1989). 
Predictably APEC countries differ in their opinion as to Soviet inclusion. 
ASEAN would probably support Soviet inclusion, maybe as a counter to China 
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(Canberra Times 1989). Australia has no ideological objections, although 
it sees Soviet participation as unlikely at this stage (Scott 1989). The 
United States however, probably has strong objections, and Japan certainly 
does due to its dispute with the Soviet Union over the Northern Islands. 
This would make Soviet participation unlikely. 
In addition, there is the question of Latin America, which probably 
fulfils geographic criteria for participation, yet is not generally 
perceived as part of the Asia-Pacific region. Latin America has expressed 
the desire to be more fully integrated into the region (San Miguel 1989). 
Yet the problem of Latin American debt and the possibility of a greater 
North-South division in APEC dialogue, makes their participation unlikely 
(McGuiness 1989). There is also the question of Mexico's inclusion, given 
its close relations with the United States. Possible Indian 
participation, on the basis of economic links, has also been raised 
(Financial Review 1989e). 
There also needs to be consideration of participation by other nations 
which are geographically part of the region. The inclusion of Vietnam and 
Cambodia has been considered, and dismissed on the bases of a lack of 
economic linkages to the region, and ideology (Stutchbury 1989). Yet 
Vietnam is being credited with the potential to become the next NIE and 
there is potential for greatly expanded economic links with the region. 
Therefore its case for inclusion may strengthen. 
The Pacific Island nations are also geographically part of the greater 
Pacific region. New Zealand and ASEAN seem keen to find some way of 
including these tiny states (Aznam 1989). Group participation in terms of 
the South Pacific Forum has been suggested. Yet there are reservations on 
both sides regarding economic size and regional economic links. As Aikman 
(1983) has argued, South Pacific states fear domination and de facto 
colonial control, but are afraid of being excluded due to the fragility of 
their economies. 
Finally there are the demands of the EC which believes it should be given 
at least an observer role in APEC, on the basis of economic links as a 
substantial proportion of EC trade is with the Asia-Pacific region (Aznam 
1989). This demand is interesting, as the EC initially opposed the 
formation of APEC until it realised that APEC was not intended to become a 
trading bloc (The Economist 1989b, Financial Times 1989). 
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The participation issue is highly complex and rests not just on the 
political sensitivities of existing participants, but also on the lack of 
definition of what constitutes the Asia-Pacific region. If one accepts 
geographic criteria, there is a case for inclusion of all the countries 
mentioned above, except the EC and India. On political or ideological 
criteria, if one accepts the idea of Western ideology, perhaps only the 
addition of the Pacific Island states and Hong Kong is feasible. If it is 
a forum for communication between different economies, all should 
participate. On the basis of existing economic links with the region, the 
exclusion of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Pacific Islands and 
Latin America become obvious, with the interesting inclusion of the EC and 
presumably any other country which has demonstrated economic ties. 
However, if the criterion is altered to that of potential economic links, 
exclusion cannot be so definite. 
Of course the issue of definition is not as simple as this and will 
include, to some degree, all of the geographical, political, ideological 
and economic criteria. However, the particular combination of such 
criteria has not yet been determined and remains one of the political 
challenges which APEC will have to face. 
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CONCLUSION 
The political agenda underlying the responses to APEC are largely 
compatible, in that most specifically focus on APEC' s first and third 
objectives. However, the agenda are not limited to this. Each country 
does have specific and unique motivations and these all contribute to a 
network of interactively linked issues. 
There is, however, a general recognition of the advantages of closer co-
ordination of economic activities and policies. This is not only a 
response to the uneven structural adjustment of the region, but a 
recognition of the regional gains to be made as a result of the 
internationalisation of economic relations. Closer structural integration 
in the Asia-Pacific region could enhance trade and economic gains in the 
pursuit of regional growth. 
Those countries which have more thoroughly explored the potential 
advantages of regional economic co-operation also focus on the need for 
greater dialogue on, and communication of, economic policy throughout the 
region. Access to more comprehensive and standardised information would 
aid in the achievement of closer economic co-ordination. 
This has especial relevance to current trade tensions. The United States, 
Japan and South Korea very much perceive advantages in APEC as a 
multilateral forum through which to conduct dialogue and negotiation in an 
effort to reduce bilateral tensions. However, these tensions, which 
largely concern trade imbalances, are by nature divisive and therefore 
caution must be observed in any conclusion that APEC will inevitably 
reduce them. It is possible that such tensions could be increased. Yet, 
greater information on other countries' policies, and co-operation on 
pragmatic economic issues, may aid in the resolution of bilateral issues. 
APEC's third objective, that of responding to the limits of 
multilateralism in dealing with Asia-Pacific issues, received unanimous 
support. This was probably due to it being an obvious agendum on which to 
focus. All in the region have an interest in furthering current 
multilateral trade negotiations, and so co-operating with respect to the 
Uruguay Round was a relatively easy issue on which to adopt a common 
position. Despite this, the agreement was significant as the region had 
not previously adopted a common economic position in international fora. 
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However, APEC's third objective encompasses more than just the Uruguay 
Round. If the Round was to fail, or at least be unsatisfactory to 
regional interests, APEC may provide a forum through which to negotiate 
greater liberalisation of regional trade, without aiming at a 
protectionist trading bloc. In addition, the utility of a common regional 
position may also be recognised with respect to participation in other 
international fora. The smaller APEC countries emphasised the utility of 
such a common bargaining position. 
APEC participants' political agenda are not limited to the above three 
objectives. The potential use of APEC to facilitate definition of 
regional roles was an implicit agendum for virtually all APEC countries. 
This has the potential to cause conflict within APEC, and very much 
revolves around the issue of leadership. However, if the declared 
commitment of all to consensual relations is maintained, along with 
recognition of the constraints from regional diversity, then APEC may 
provide a forum in which responsibility and leadership are shared in a 
process of regional community building for common ends. 
In addition, ASEAN has perhaps the most complex agenda underlying its 
participation in APEC. 
may be undermined or 
ASEAN's sensitivities to the possibility that it 
dominated in a larger regional forum, place 
constraints on the progress of APEC. This was evident in ASEAN's focus on 
the institutional form of APEC. The ensuing debate was perhaps at odds 
with the universally expressed desire for a gradual and informal process 
of co-operation. However, 
obvious APEC objective, 
institutionalisation is unlikely to become an 
although it does require a more definite 
conceptualisation of the formality of -the process of Asia-Pacific 
regionalism. In addition, the issue of participation in APEC is still 
unresolved, and this involves differing political and security interests 
of the regional countries, as well as the necessity for a more precise 
idea of what defines exclusiveness in an Asia-Pacific sense. 
Therefore, the formation of APEC and the issues it provokes have 
implications for theories of regionalism. APEC is part of a tentative 
regional process of community building, aimed at co-operation which 
embodies open dialogue and consensus in an essentially informal process. 
The aim of APEC is to facilitate greater regional co-ordination of 
economic activities and policies at a government level, in order to take 
advantage of changes in the structure of regional, and international, 
trade and economic relations . Although it is not envisaged that regional 
interests will overwhelm national interests, APEC does form part of a 
process of mutual identification of interests and the sense that optimal 
economic gains can only be achieved through co-operation. 
As a result of structural changes in the international economy, which 
result in greater global interdependence, outward oriented regional co-
operation of this form may become a necessity in order to adjust to, and 
take advantage of, these changes. Traditional notions of state 
sovereignty are being undermined as global interdependence reduces state 
control over domestic affairs and international relations. Formal 
regional economic and political integration is perhaps too rigid to 
respond to the effects of globalisation. Instead, loose regional co-
operatives which aim at greater (but not formal) structural integration, 
may prove the optimal way to gain from, and further, the inevitable 
process of interdependence. 
APEC therefore has to be viewed as part of this international process, and 
as a recognition of the potential gains regional co-operation can bring in 
this context. The feasibility of APEC is a separate issue. Despite 
considerable variation in the political agenda of participating countries, 
there is sufficient commonality in focus on APEC's objectives to conclude 
that scope for economic co-operation exists, if APEC continues to evolve 
in its current manner. 
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